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Human capital theory states that workers’ knowledge and skills increase their 
productivity and thus raise their earnings. An important dimension of human capital 
theory distinguishes between general human capital and specific human capital. 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this dissertation examine two groups of 
individuals who encounter interruptions in their work careers and cannot completely 
transfer their specific human capital to their new jobs.  
Chapter Two investigates displaced workers who lose jobs due to mass layoffs 
by their employers. Their success in job transition depends partially on the extent to 
which their human capital can be carried over across jobs. The Chapter Two analysis 
adds to the extensive literature on the earnings cost of displacement by distinguishing 
the earnings losses between high technology (hi-tech) displaced workers and low-tech 
displaced workers. Earnings losses are estimated using a generalized difference-in-
difference model which compares the earnings patterns of displaced workers with a 
comparison group of non-displaced workers. The empirical results demonstrate that 
  
earnings decline substantially upon displacement and then recover gradually. Hi-tech 
displaced workers suffer larger initial earnings losses and have faster recoveries than 
other displaced workers.  
Chapter Three examines female immigrants to the U.S. whose entry wages 
fall short of those of comparable natives because their human capital accumulated in 
foreign countries is not completely transferable to the U.S. labor market. The entire 
literature on immigrant skills has focused almost exclusively on male immigrants. 
Chapter Three extends the previous research to the population of female immigrants 
by examining changes across cohorts in their labor market skills, as measured by their 
English proficiency, educational attainment and wages. The results show that, across 
successive cohorts of female immigrants, English proficiency at entry stays constant 
and average education level increases. After controlling for human capital and 
demographic characteristics, predicted wages are lower for female immigrants upon 
entry relative to female natives. Compared to male immigrants in the same period, 
female immigrants exhibit faster growth across cohorts in educational attainment and 
in predicted wages.  
Overall, this dissertation provides further evidence of the role of specific 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Human capital theory1 states that resources embodied in people, such as 
knowledge, skills and health, contribute to increases in earnings in the same way that 
physical capital raises output and income. Activities such as education, on-the-job 
training and medical care affect individuals’ future earnings through the accumulation 
of human capital and are thus called investments in human capital. Although human 
capital theory originally was focused on explaining the substantial income growth in 
the U.S. even after controlling for growth in physical capital and labor, it also helps 
explain many aspects of workers' earnings over their lifetimes. Workers’ earnings 
increase with age at a decreasing rate. This positive and concave age-earnings profile 
can be explained by a lifetime human capital accumulation process in which 
investments are mostly concentrated at workers’ younger ages. Investments in human 
capital when workers are young provide a longer period to recoup the returns, and 
such investments are less costly earlier in life because the opportunity costs of 
investing in human capital are lower when earnings are lower. Human capital theory 
also provides important insights into the patterns and changes in the distribution of 
earnings across workers. Differences in schooling and labor market experience 
explain a significant fraction of the inequality in earnings. The explanatory power of 
the human capital model is even stronger when quality of schooling and the amount 
of on-the-job training are included in the analysis. 
                                                 
1 See Becker (1993), Mincer (1974), Ben-Porath (1967). 
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An important dimension of human capital theory is its distinction between 
general and specific human capital. General training increases a worker’s marginal 
productivity by the same amount in the firm providing the training as in other firms. 
By contrast, specific training increases productivity more in the firm providing the 
training than when the worker is employed by another firm. For example, a training 
program of communication skills is general training because it raises trainees’ 
productivity in all firms that require a similar level of communication at work; on the 
other hand, a course in a specific software used only by firm X is specific training 
because it does not contribute much, if any, to the trainee’s productivity increase in 
firms other than X.  
The distinctions between general training and specific training depend on the 
nature of training and on the extent to which employers require specific skills and 
training. For example, medical skill is specific human capital to the medical industry 
but general human capital to all hospitals. A mastery of Danish language is specific 
human capital to the Danish labor market but general human capital to all the firms in 
Denmark. If different countries are considered separate labor markets, even schooling, 
a typical general human capital in most cases, could become specific human capital. 
Knowledge about a country’s language, history and institutions is often of little value 
in another country.  
General human capital can be carried over across jobs easily while specific 
human capital is less portable. A specific skill used in a certain labor market (a firm, 
an industry or a country) would contribute less to production, and thus be less valued, 
in other labor markets. Since workers’ earnings depend on the stock of human capital, 
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the extent to which specific human capital could be transferred to a new job has a 
crucial impact on the wage received in the new job.  
This dissertation considers the work and earnings experience of workers with 
an interruption in their work careers. A central issue in this examination is the extent 
to which interrupted workers lose the benefits of accumulated specific human capital. 
The two groups of workers studied in the following two chapters have this in 
common: They both encounter an interruption in their work career and are confronted 
with the issue of transferring existing human capital to a new job. Chapter Two 
investigates the differential earnings losses between high technology (hi-tech) 
displaced workers and other displaced workers. Displaced workers are workers who 
lose jobs involuntarily because of economic reasons rather than incompetence or 
misconduct. Chapter Three examines differences in skills across successive cohorts of 
female immigrants. Cohorts are defined by the arrival years of immigrants. These two 
groups of subjects differ in one important respect: Displaced workers lose their jobs 
because of an exogenous economic shock, while most immigrants (except refugees 
and those seeking asylum) choose to migrate voluntarily. However, both groups of 
workers face the reality that their specific human capital cannot be completely 
transferred to their new jobs and both will experience a process of adapting to new 
job environments.  
The earnings effect of displacements has been one of the central issues in the 
economic analysis of job displacements. A large body of previous evidence has 
shown that displaced workers suffer substantial long-term earnings losses post-
displacement (e.g. Ruhm 1991, Jacobson et al. 1993, Stevens 1997). One of the 
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theoretical reasons for this earnings effect is the loss of human capital specific to the 
old job2. (This lost skill could be either industry-specific human capital or firm-
specific human capital.) Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis includes the 
findings that displaced workers reemployed within their pre-displacement industries 
have smaller earnings losses than those who switch industries (Carrington 1993, Ong 
and Mar (1992)) and that displaced workers with longer tenure on the old job tend to 
suffer greater earnings losses (Hamermesh (1987), Topel (1990)).  
By accumulating job-specific skills in their new positions, displaced workers 
experience earnings recoveries. But, despite relatively fast earnings growth after 
displacement, displaced workers’ earnings still do not catch up with the level of 
comparable non-displaced workers. An explanation proposed in Stevens (1997) is an 
unstable recovery process interrupted by additional job losses in subsequent years.  
A similar process affects immigrants to the United States, who often earn 
lower wages on arrival than natives with similar measurable characteristics (e.g. 
Chiswick 1977, 1978), indicating that not all human capital accumulated in the home 
country can be transferred to the U.S. labor market. Evidence demonstrates that the 
greater the economic and social distance between home country and the U.S., the 
larger the human capital devaluation. Chiswick (1977) shows that immigrants 
experience an occupational downgrading on arrival in the U.S., and that this 
downgrading is smallest among immigrants from English-speaking countries, 
                                                 
2 Earnings losses upon displacement could also be explained by other theories. For example, workers may receive 
wages lower than their marginal productivity in the early phase of a job in return for higher wages later (Lazear 
1981). This tilted wage profile could lead to a wage loss upon displacement if workers are displaced during the 
stage when their old wages are higher than their marginal productivity.   
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followed by those from other developed countries, and is largest from developing 
countries.  
Following the initial earnings drop at entry, immigrants have higher earnings 
growth than the native-born with comparable characteristics (Chiswick 1978, 1980, 
Duleep and Regets 1997)3. Several factors explain this pattern (Duleep and Regets 
1997). First, immigrants accumulate U.S.-specific labor market skills, which are 
complementary to the human capital they bring from their home countries. For 
example, improving English proficiency or obtaining U.S. professional certificates 
could presumably boost the rental price of their total human capital. Second, with 
lower earnings at entry than natives, immigrants have relatively lower opportunity 
costs for investing in human capital and thus a larger incentive to undertake more 
investment. The investment could take the form of participating in more on-the-job 
training or changing jobs more frequently.  
For both displaced workers and immigrants, the initial wage drop and 
subsequent earnings recovery reflect a process of devaluation and then subsequent 
restoration in human capital. Mincer and Ofek (1982) argue that the productivity, and 
thus the market value, of the “deficient” human capital declines greatly even if only 
small parts of the total human capital are lost. Put in terms of the Ben-Porath human 
capital production model, the deficiency of human capital reduces its market 
productivity to a greater extent than its ability to reproduce itself. Therefore, the 
opportunity costs of reproducing human capital for the interrupted workers are lower 
than for stayers (non-displaced workers in the case of displaced workers and natives 
                                                 
3 There is little consensus in the literature on whether the wages of immigrants could eventually converge to those 
of ethnically similar natives. See a summary in Borjas (1994) Page 1680. 
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in the case of immigrants), leading to larger investments and steeper wage growth 
among the interrupted workers than among the stayers. This model in Mincer and 
Ofek (1982) explains the wage changes of female workers after an extended period of 
withdrawl from the labor force; therefore, it suggests skill erosion from disuse as the 
cause of human capital depreciation. By contrast, displaced workers and immigrants 
tend to have very brief interruptions so the devaluation of human capital for these two 
groups is driven by a different factor - untransferrability of human capital from the 
old job to the new job. 
The effects of job displacement and immigration on earnings and human 
capital are two widely studied topics in Labor Economics. This dissertation focuses 
on two specific issues in these two areas. The first issue is whether hi-tech displaced 
workers suffer different earnings losses compared to other displaced workers. The 
second issue is whether the labor market skills of female immigrants have changed 
across successive cohorts in recent decades.  
Extending the large literature on the earnings consequences of job 
displacement, Chapter Two investigates whether hi-tech displaced workers suffer 
different earnings losses than other displaced workers. This study is mainly motivated 
by the increase of job losses in hi-tech industries during the past decade. Economic 
theories suggest that displacement might have different earnings consequences for hi-
tech displaced workers than other displaced workers. On the one hand, hi-tech 
workers may have more opportunities in the labor market because their higher skills 
are better suited to an economy that rewards skills and education. On the other hand, 
hi-tech workers may have more difficulties in transferring their skills to new jobs and 
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thus encounter greater human capital devaluation. The obstacle to skill transfer could 
result from the “niche” labor market of hi-tech industries, where skills useful in one 
job may not be valued in another (Meares (1999), Violante (2002)), or from the 
tendency in hi-tech industries to abolish positions associated with obsolete skills. 
Workers with very specific or outdated skills would have more trouble moving 
smoothly to a new job. 
An extensive panel data set of individual workers is used to estimate job 
displacement effects in the period 1989-2005. A cohort of individual workers are 
observed repeatedly every quarter, with information on their quarterly earnings, firm 
code, industry code and employer size available. The longitudinal feature of this data 
set permits examination of the long term earnings effects of displacement and helps to 
control for unobserved individual characteristics using workers’ earnings history. To 
identify hi-tech workers, industry-level technology measures are linked to individual 
workers using each firm’s industry codes. With no occupation information available, 
income rankings are used as a proxy for workers’ occupations. Exploiting the 
information on firm code and employer size in each quarter, this study defines 
displaced workers as those who leave a job as part of a mass layoff. This definition of 
job displacement ensures that voluntary job quitters or fired workers are not 
misclassified as displaced workers.    
The empirical results of Chapter Two show that displaced workers’ earnings 
decline substantially on job loss and then recover gradually. This finding is consistent 
with results in previous research and is consistent with the human capital devaluation 
and restoration hypothesis proposed by Mincer and Ofek (1982). One of the principal 
  8  
contributions of Chapter Two to the literature is the finding that hi-tech displaced 
workers suffer greater earnings losses upon displacement and have faster earnings 
recoveries than other displaced workers. This difference in earnings trend between the 
two groups is consistent with the theory that hi-tech workers have a larger fraction of 
specific human capital. The larger loss of the specific skills leads to the larger 
earnings drop during job transition, and the greater accumulation of new job-specific 
skills contributes to the steeper earnings growth on the new job. 
Similar to an involuntary job loss, migrating to a new country is another 
typical example of interruption in a work career. The U.S. has received a large 
number of immigrants, and the proportion of immigrants in the U.S. population has 
increased dramatically in recent decades. The quality of immigrants’ labor market 
skills is an important concern in assessing how much recent immigrants contribute to 
the U.S. economy. The literature has focused almost exclusively on male immigrants, 
despite the fact that female immigrants constitute about 50 percent of the immigrant 
population. The important role female immigrants play in the host country economy 
has been illustrated by the Family Investment Model (Duleep and Sanders 1993) 
which demonstrates that wives in immigrant families participate in the U.S. labor 
market to finance their husbands’ initial investments in U.S.-specific human capital to 
maximize the family’s permanent income. Examination of the quality changes across 
female immigrant cohorts facilitates comparisons of the labor market performance of 
female immigrants and male immigrants, which is studied far less than the gender 
earnings differentials among the native-born. In addition, the investigation of female 
immigrants’ skill changes over time is important in assessing the validity of 
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estimating assimilation rates (the wage effects of years since migration) using cross-
sectional data. Borjas (1985) documented that skill declines across immigrant cohorts 
would generate an upward bias in the assimilation rates estimated using cross-
sectional data. 
Changes in the labor market skills of immigrants could be driven by changes 
in the U.S. demand for immigrants, reflected in changes in immigration laws, as well 
as changes in the supply of immigrants in home countries. Immigration laws in favor 
of visas issued for family reunification relative to skill-based visas presumably would 
decrease the average immigrant's skills. On the contrary, policies strengthening the 
control of illegal immigrants would lower the number of unauthorized immigrants, 
who are usually less skilled than legal immigrants, and would raise the average 
immigrant's skills. On the supply side, immigrants are a self-selected group who 
choose to migrate only when the migration costs, including physical and psychic 
costs, can be fully compensated by greater income in the U.S. Therefore, any factor 
affecting the migration costs or earnings expectation in the U.S. and the home country 
could affect which groups of immigrants are drawn to the U.S. 
Labor market skills of female immigrants are measured in Chapter Three by 
three indicators: English proficiency, educational attainment and earnings capacity. 
The first two measures are directly compared across immigrant cohorts using raw 
data from the U.S. Census. Earnings capacity is compared both in raw terms and after 
controlling for education, experience, marital status, etc. The analysis of “residual” 
earnings provides insights into trends in the unobserved dimensions of immigrants’ 
productivity, such as quality of schooling, innate ability and self-motivation.  
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The results in Chapter Three show that, across successive cohorts of female 
immigrants, English proficiency at entry stays constant and average education level 
increases. Regression-adjusted wages are lower for female immigrants at entry 
compared to natives, indicating a devaluation of immigrants’ human capital brought 
from the home country.4 The unobserved dimension of labor productivity increases 
for many female immigrants from 1970 to 1980, contrary to the quality decline of 
male immigrants in the same period documented in Borjas (1985). From 1980 to 1990, 
Asian and Mexican immigrants both experienced skill declines but the reasons vary. 
Overall, the skill change is becoming more stable, with a smaller degree of skill 
change in the most recent decade.                                                                                                                  
The following two chapters are two illustrations of the manifestation of 
human capital through workers’ labor market experiences. These two investigations 
provide further evidence of the importance of specific human capital in explaining 






                                                 
4 Language ability, educational attainment and earnings capacity all increase with years of stay in the U.S., 
reflecting the assimilation, or human capital restoration, process. Although some results regarding the assimilation 
process are presented, Chapter Two focuses on changes in immigrants’ skills measured on migration rather than 
after a lengthy stay in the U.S. 
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Chapter 2: Technology and Displaced Workers’ Earnings Losses 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The employment and earnings consequences of job displacement have long 
been an important dimension in labor economics research, and concerns about 
earnings declines after job losses have led to many policy initiatives to assist 
displaced workers. Initially, the focus was on manufacturing and blue collar workers, 
where large-scale job displacements took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Over the last 
decade, an increased number of displacements occurred in high technology (hi-tech) 
industries, which employ many highly educated and skilled employees.  
In this chapter, hi-tech industries are defined as industries with intensive 
computer usage, with a large fraction of investment in hi-tech equipment, or with a 
high concentration of scientists and engineers. Some examples of hi-tech industries 
are communication, professional services, machinery manufacturing, and chemicals 
and allied products manufacturing. Displacements increased markedly in many hi-
tech industries from the early 1990s to the beginning of the new century. For example, 
between 1993 and 2001, the displacement rate increased from eight percent to 12 
percent in the communication industry, from 11 percent to 20 percent in the 
machinery manufacturing industry, and from 10 percent to 14 percent in the business 
services industry, calculated using data from the Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS)5. 
During this time period, the displacement rate remained constant or declined in most 
                                                 
5 The displacement rate is calculated by the same approach as in Farber et al 1997. 
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low-tech industries where computer usage and concentration of scientists and 
engineers is low.   
Increases in displacement in hi-tech industries are driven by several forces. 
The rapid expansion in the IT sector followed by the “dot-com bubble burst” in 2000 
increased the number of displacements among hi-tech workers. According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Mass Layoff Statistics, the number of mass layoff 
events in the IT sector tripled between 2000 and 2001, compared to an average of 38 
percent growth for all sectors. Other hi-tech industries also experienced above 
average increases in mass layoffs during this period. For example, mass layoffs 
increased by 86 percent in the chemical manufacturing industry, by 70 percent in 
professional and technical services, and by 49 percent in the finance and insurance 
industry. The 2000-2001 recession was followed by a period of only moderate 
employment growth, with employment in professional and business services, finance, 
and information sectors in 2003 at the same levels as in the 2000 pre-recession peak.   
Even before the “dot-com bubble burst”, rapid growth of innovation and the 
recurrent closing of startup firms contributed to the rising number of displaced hi-tech 
workers. Compared to the total private sector, the information industry had a 20 
percent higher annual rate of establishments closing between 1996 and 2004, 
according to the author’s calculation using business employment dynamics data from 
the BLS. Moreover, the recent upsurge in outsourcing also increases the risk of 
displacement in hi-tech sectors. With improvements in communication technology, 
more and more firms move jobs such as computer programming or call-center 
operations to lower-wage countries. This trend of increased outsourcing is evident in 
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trade flow data which shows that imports of computer and information services6 as a 
share of total private services imports in 2003 is more than five times larger than that 
in 1998, more than twice the rate of growth of their counterpart in exports during this 
period. The number of domestic job losses due to outsourcing is estimated to range 
from 34,000 to 72,000 per year in IT sectors after 2000.7  
This paper explores the differential earnings consequence of displacement 
between hi-tech displaced workers and other displaced workers. There are several 
reasons why hi-tech displaced workers might face different earnings losses than other 
displaced workers. Hi-tech workers could have more opportunities than other workers 
in the labor market because their higher skills are better suited to an economy that 
rewards skills and education. However, hi-tech displaced workers may suffer larger 
earnings losses because their human capital depreciates faster. Hi-tech industries may 
intend to displace workers whose skills are obsolete, creating a barrier to re-enter a 
job with similar pay.  
Another reason for different displacement costs between hi-tech workers and 
other workers is the different skill transferability across jobs. Theory provides 
ambiguous predictions on the sign of the relationship between skill transferability and 
technology. On the one hand, the hi-tech labor market is called a “niche” labor market 
where skills useful in one job may not be valued in another job (Meares 1999, 
Violante 2002). This feature makes it difficult for hi-tech workers to transfer skills to 
new jobs or to form another good match after job loss. On the other hand, information 
technology (IT), an important component of current hi-tech industries, is called a 
                                                 
6 Computer and information services imports include computer and data processing services and database and 
other information services. Data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
7 See Bednarzik 2005. 
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“general purpose” technology which spreads to most sectors (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1995, Jovanovic and Rousseau 2005, Aghion, Howitt and Violante 2002). 
For example, programming skills can be used in various sectors and jobs. This feature 
facilitates skill transfers across jobs. It thus remains an empirical question as to which 
of these two features dominates the skill transferability of hi-tech workers. 
This paper examines the long-term earnings consequences of displacement, 
applying a generalized difference-in-difference model that compares the earnings 
patterns of displaced workers with a comparison group of non-displaced workers. 
Data used in this paper are drawn from Maryland Unemployment Insurance wage 
records, linked with several industry-level technology measures. The longitudinal 
feature of this data set provides information on the long term effects of displacement 
and also helps to control for worker heterogeneity. The results demonstrate that the 
initial earnings losses after displacement are higher for hi-tech displaced workers than 
for other displaced workers. But in the long run, hi-tech displaced workers experience 
faster earnings recovery and the earnings loss differences between hi-tech and low-
tech workers tend to disappear. Industry-level technology is measured by several 
alternative indicators: the fraction of employees using computers at work, the fraction 
of investment in hi-tech equipment, and the fraction of scientists and engineers in the 
industry’s workforce. 
The question of whether hi-tech displaced workers have higher earnings losses 
than other displaced workers is important to both policymakers and researchers. In 
order to design effective programs to assist displaced workers, policymakers need 
information on the distribution and magnitude of earnings losses associated with 
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displacement. To the extent that hi-tech workers are found to have larger earnings 
losses because of displacement, government assistance programs could be designed to 
reflect these differences. If displacement costs are higher for hi-tech workers, this 
potential uncertainty might discourage people from investing in hi-tech skills, and in 
turn reduce long-term economic growth. Assistance programs from the government 
such as retraining or employment services could alleviate this risk associated with 
investing in hi-tech skills.  
For researchers, information about earnings patterns of hi-tech displaced 
workers adds to knowledge of displacement costs and the impact of technology on the 
labor market. Identifying the differences in earnings losses between hi-tech displaced 
workers and other displaced workers is the first step toward studying the channels 
through which technology affects displaced workers’ earnings losses. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
An extensive literature on displaced workers has examined earnings losses 
and the subsequent employment experience of workers with different demographic 
characteristics, industry categories, and occupations. Previous papers have found that 
displaced workers suffer substantial long-term losses, regardless of gender, age, or 
race (Ruhm 1991, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993, Schoeni and Dardia 1996, 
Ann Huff Stevens 1997, Kletzer and Fairlie 2003). For example, Jacobson et al. 
(1993) shows that high-tenure displaced workers suffer 25 percent earnings losses 
even six years after displacement. The literature also shows that some displaced 
workers suffer larger earnings losses than others. For example, earnings losses are 
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positively related to displaced workers’ tenures on the old jobs (Hamermesh 1989, 
Topel 1990); workers who switch industries after displacement tend to lose more 
(Podgursky and Swaim 1987, Addison and Portugal 1989, Carrington 1993, Neal 
1995); and, displaced workers' earnings losses also depend on the general conditions 
of their industries or local labor market (Howland and Peterson 1988). 
Recent evidence has shown that job loss rates have declined in manufacturing 
industries and increased in services industries, and displacements have been 
spreading across various occupations, rather than concentrating in blue-collar, 
production occupations (Kletzer 1998, Farber et al. 1997, Fallick 1996). Using very 
recent data through 2003, Farber (2005) found that there was an upward trend in job 
loss rates for more educated workers in the early and mid-1990s and again after 2000, 
and earnings losses have been larger for displaced workers who have attended college 
than for workers with less education since the end of 1990s. 
Relatively little work has examined workers displaced in hi-tech industries. 
Addison, Fox and Ruhm (2000) examined the relationship between technology and 
the probability of job displacement. They found that the risk of job loss is relatively 
high for workers employed in industries with high investment in computer 
technologies and with high fraction of scientists and engineers in the workforce. 
Papers studying the consequences of hi-tech displaced workers focused on whether 
displaced workers remaining in hi-tech industries fared better than those switching to 
non hi-tech industries. Ong and Mar (1992) found that displaced workers in Silicon 
Valley’s semiconductor industry suffered large earnings losses if they were 
reemployed outside hi-tech sectors, but that there were small losses or no losses at all 
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if workers were reemployed in similar industries. Dardia et al. 2005 and Hotchkiss 
2005 found that workers who switched from IT-producing industries to other 
industries after displacement suffered larger earnings losses than those who stayed in 
IT-producing industries. Since these papers examine different samples and cover 
different time periods than Jacobson et al., the results are not comparable enough to 
address adequately the issue of whether hi-tech displaced workers have different 




2.3.1 MD UI Data 
Data used in this paper are drawn from the Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
wage records of Maryland (MD) extending from 1989 through 2005. The UI dataset 
is an administrative dataset compiled by the state government for the purpose of 
collecting unemployment insurance contributions from employers. In each quarter, 
employers report to the state government how much they pay to each employee. MD 
UI data cover more than 90 percent of the MD workforce. Workers who are not 
included in this dataset are mainly federal government employees, self-employed 
individuals, and workers in small agricultural enterprises.  
This study draws a 10 percent random sample of all Maryland workers who 
were working in the first quarter of 1992 (1992:1).8 The sample is restricted to 
                                                 
8 By using this fixed cohort of workers, I miss workers who entered labor market after 1992:1. However, Census 
data from 1990 and 2000 show that the composition of Maryland workers did not change much between 1990 and 
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workers in firms with more than 50 workers in 1992:1. With this restriction, there is a 
99.5 percent probability that at least one worker is sampled from each firm. In the 
baseline sample, only workers who have positive earnings in each calendar year are 
included since it is not known what workers with missing earnings were doing. This 
sample selection criterion eliminates 60 percent of workers, with 40 percent 
permanently disappearing from the data and the remaining 20 percent temporarily 
disappearing. The statistical results will be affected by this sample selection if hi-tech 
and low-tech workers with missing earnings data are systematically different. 
Possible biases due to missing earnings are investigated in Section V.3. To reduce the 
computational burden, a 15 percent random sample is drawn for non displaced 
workers.  
The resulting baseline sample analyzed has 4,547 workers displaced between 
1992:1 and 2004:3 and 5,995 workers who are never displaced. For each displaced 
worker, up to 41 quarters are included in the sample, from the 20th quarter before job 
loss, or the beginning of the sample period, to the 20th quarter after job loss, or the 
end of the sample period. For non-displaced workers, there are up to 67 quarters from 
1989:1 to 2005:3 recorded for each person. The total number of person-quarter 
records analyzed is 576,400.  
The MD UI data provide information on the workers and the firms. For each 
worker, the data report the quarterly earnings and the employer identification number 
(EIN) in each quarter. For workers who hold more than one job in a given quarter, the 
job that pays the most is used to define the employer and the worker's earnings. For 
                                                                                                                                           
2000. See Appendix Table A1. 
  19  
each firm9, the data reports the industry code by the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system (before 2001) or the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) (since 2001) in each quarter, and the quarterly 
employment level for the firm (the number of wage records). By linking the firm’s 
information to workers, every worker’s quarterly earnings, industry, and firm size in 
each quarter can be identified. 
The use of MD UI data instead of other national representative datasets offers 
a number of advantages. MD UI data cover almost the entire MD workforce and have 
a large sample of displaced workers. This linked employer-employee data set allows 
precise identification of job separations and subsequent employment and earnings 
consequences. As an administrative data set, it reports more accurate information on 
displacements and earnings than survey data. The UI data avoid the problems of other 
national representative datasets that have the disadvantages of smaller samples and 
biases associated with imperfect recall by survey participants of their job histories.10    
Finally, while the Maryland data are not representative of the whole nation, 
the industry distribution in Maryland is broadly similar to that in the whole U.S., with 
the principal exception that Maryland has larger fraction of workers in services and 
public administration and a smaller fraction of workers in manufacturing (Table 2.1).  
Also, employment changes in Maryland over time mimic those in the U.S., as shown 
in Figures 2.1a through 2.1d. Figure 2.1a demonstrates that the employment changes 
                                                 
9 More than 90% of the reporting employing units have a single establishment, but some reporting units have 
multiple establishments. For example, a chain supermarket may have separate EINs for each of the store, or it may 
combine all the stores into a single EIN. Since the majority of the reporting units have single establishment, I use 
employer, firm, and establishment interchangeably in this paper. 
10 The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) have 
small samples of displaced workers. The number of displaced workers is in hundreds in these two datasets. DWS 
has a severe problem of recall bias as documented in Topel 1990. For more information on the problems and 
benefits of using DWS and UI data to study displaced workers, see Hildreth, Wachter, and Handwerker 2005. 
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in all private sectors are similar between Maryland and the U.S. Figures 2.1b through 
2.1d demonstrate that three typical hi-tech industries have employment trends in 
Maryland that are very similar to those for the entire U.S.  
However, there are two limitations to the Maryland UI data. The reasons 
workers drop out of the data are unknown. Workers who leave the dataset all have 
missing earnings after they disappear. Some of them actually have positive earnings if 
they are reemployed outside of Maryland or become federal government employees, 
while others who remain non-employed have zero earnings. This attrition would bias 
the estimated earnings losses differential between hi-tech and low-tech workers if hi-
tech “disappearers” are more likely to have positive earnings. For example, if the 
majority of the hi-tech workers who leave the dataset on displacement are reemployed 
in other states while the majority of the low-tech workers who leave the dataset on 
displacement have long spells of unemployment, then the estimates would overstate 
the earnings losses of hi-tech displaced workers compared to those of low-tech 
workers. This potential attrition bias will be analyzed in the next section. A second 
shortcoming of this data is the lack of demographic information on workers that is 
typically used in studies of labor market outcomes. As a remedy, this chapter employs 
individual fixed effects to control for time-invariant person specific characteristics, 
such as gender, race, education and innate ability.  
 
2.3.2 Measures of Technology 
Since there is no perfect measure of industry level technology, several 
alternative measures are used in the analysis. The use of computer and related 
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equipment is frequently used as a measure of technology (Autor, Levy and Murnane 
2003, Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998, Bartel and Sicherman 1999, Bartel and 
Sicherman 1998, Addison, Fox and Ruhm 2000). The first indicator, therefore, is the 
fraction of workers using computers at work in each industry, obtained from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Computer and Internet Usage Supplement in 1997 
and 2001. However, this indicator ignores the technology content of computers. For 
example, a computer used for bookkeeping has a lower technology content than a 
computer used for software development. A second indicator based on the value of 
computers and other hi-tech equipment reflects the degree of sophistication of the 
equipment. This second measure is the fraction of new investment in hi-tech 
equipment, obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s capital flow data 
for 1992 and 1997. Hi-tech equipment includes computers and peripheral equipment, 
communication equipment, photocopy and related equipment in 1992. In 1997, hi-
tech equipment includes the above three categories plus software. 
Some hi-tech industries are not characterized by intensive utilization of 
computers, so two other technology measures are introduced. One is R&D 
expenditure as a share of total sales, obtained from the 1988-2001 National Science 
Foundation (NSF) R&D tables. The other is fraction of scientists and engineers in the 
workforce, calculated from CPS 1994, 1998 and 2002. Selected values for these four 
technology measures by industry are presented in Appendix Table A2.2. These 
industry-level technology measures are linked to each person-quarter observation by 
the industry where the individual works in a quarter. Details of the linking process are 
discussed in Appendix 2B. 
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Correlation coefficients are calculated for these four measures of technology 
across industries, using values in 1997 or 1998 (applying industry aggregation as 
necessary to make industry definitions across the four measures comparable). The 
correlation coefficient is 0.58 between the first indicator and the second indicator, 
0.29 between the first indicator and the third indicator, 0.57 between the first and the 
fourth and 0.31 between the third and the fourth. The positive correlation coefficients 
are consistent with the fact that industries ranked high by one technology measure are 
also ranked high by another measure in most cases. The low correlation coefficients 
between the R&D indicator and other indicators suggest that the R&D indicator may 
measure a different aspect of technology than the other three measures. Using 
alternative technology measures in the analysis increases the robustness of results. 
 
2.4 Definition of Displacement and Stylized Facts 
 
Displaced workers are defined as workers leaving a firm as part of a mass 
layoff, where more than 30 percent of employment is reduced across consecutive 
quarters.11 This same definition was used in earlier papers by Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993) and Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002). Because the Maryland UI data 
do not have information on the reason a worker leaves a job, using mass-layoff to 
define displacement avoids the potential biases of including discharges for cause and 
                                                 
11 I tested an alternative definition of displacement based on plant closing (where workers leaving a job due to 
plant closing are defined as displaced workers). The short term results are the same as those presented in this paper. 
In the longer term, hi-tech displaced workers show better recovery, probably because plant closing captures lots of 
startup firm closings which displace young workers with frontier technology. Or it could be because plant closing 
mainly captures seasonal jobs since there is strong seasonality in the earnings trend of workers displaced from 
closing plants (see Appendix Figure 1).  
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quits as displacements. Although some separators in this mass-layoff sample may be 
quitters or fired workers, the majority is displaced for economic reasons.  
Displaced workers are identified in the following procedure. First, a firm with 
more than 50 workers is recorded as having a displacement in quarter t if its 
employment level is reduced by more than 30 percent from t to t+1 and remains low 
for three more quarters.12 In cases in which more than 30 percent of a firm’s workers 
move to the same new firm in the following quarter, it is assumed that a merger or a 
split has occurred, and the original firm is recorded as not having a displacement in 
this quarter. Second, based on this definition of firm mass-layoff, any given worker is 
defined as displaced if this worker leaves a firm in the quarter when the firm has a 
mass-layoff, and does not return to this firm within four quarters. This procedure for 
defining displaced workers therefore includes workers who lose their jobs 
involuntarily and permanently due to economic reasons rather than their own 
misbehavior. To avoid the effects of multiple displacements, only the first observed 
displacement is included in the analysis. 
To illustrate the earnings losses from displacement, earnings between 1994:4 
and 2004:4 are drawn in Figure 2.2 for workers displaced in 1999:4, a quarter with a 
relatively large number of displacements, as well as for workers who are never 
displaced as a reference group. To show the role of technology in earnings losses, 
Figure 2.2a presents earnings of workers in industries with above median computer 
usage and Figure 2.2b presents earnings of workers in industries with below median 
computer usage. A comparison between Figure 2.2a and 2.2b suggests that hi-tech 
                                                 
12 Requiring three more quarters of low employment avoids the effects of measurement errors and seasonal 
employment changes.  
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workers suffer larger earnings losses upon displacement. For hi-tech workers, 
earnings drop about $6000, or 75 percent, from pre-displacement levels; while for 
low-tech workers, the drop is about $3000, or 50 percent. 
Figure 2.2 shows that there are systematic differences between displaced and 
non-displaced workers, and between hi-tech and low-tech workers. These 
heterogeneities must be taken into account to get unbiased estimates of differential 
displacement effects between hi-tech and low-tech workers, especially when no 
controls for human capital variables are available in the data. Another point worth 
noting from Figure 2.2b is that earnings start to decline before displacement. 
Therefore, it is important to pick a time period several quarters before displacement 
as a reference period in estimating total earnings losses to avoid underestimating 
earnings losses.13 
The simple illustration in Figure 2.2 highlights the basic feature of earnings 
losses differential between hi-tech versus low-tech workers. However, it only portrays 
a snapshot of a particular cohort of displaced workers in a 10-year window. A 
comprehensive statistical analysis aggregating all displaced workers and spanning the 
entire sample period is presented in the following section. 
 
2.5 Empirical Specification and Results 
2.5.1 Empirical Specification 
Displaced workers’ overall earnings losses are the summation of actual 
earnings losses and the foregone earnings they could have earned in the absence of 
                                                 
13 Pre-displacement losses are also documented in Jacobson et al 1993.  
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displacements. Actual earnings declines after job loss are equal to earnings in the 
post-displacement periods minus pre-displacement earnings in some base period 
when the effects of displacement had not yet begun. In summary, displaced workers’ 
earnings losses at a post-displacement time t can be written as:  
(EarningsD,t- EarningsD,0)- (EarningsN,t- EarningsN,0). 
The term in the first parenthesis calculates displaced workers’ actual earnings 
change from a base period (period 0) to some post-displacement period (period t). 
The term in the second parenthesis calculates non-displaced workers’ earnings 
changes between time 0 and time t, which is used as a proxy for displaced workers’ 
hypothetical earnings growth in the absence of displacement. Examining pre-
displaced earnings in the UI data shows that earnings between displaced workers and 
non-displaced workers are not significantly different three years before the job loss, 
so the base period is chosen as 12 quarters before displacement. 
Overall earnings losses are estimated using a generalized difference-in-











,          (1)               
where Yit is person i’s earnings in quarter t;14 the individual fixed effect αi controls for 
time-invariant person specific characteristics; the set of quarterly dummies Qt control 
for changes in the macroeconomic environment; and kitD  are dummy variables 
representing the event of displacement, where k stands for the number of quarters 
after (before) displacement if k is positive (negative). For example, if person i is 
                                                 
14 The reason why earnings levels is used instead of log earnings is because log transformation can not properly 
deal with zero earnings in the regression. 
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displaced in 1998:3, then his/her 1itD  is equal to 1 in 1998:4 and his 
2−
itD  is equal to 1 
in 1998:1. K ranges from -12 to 20, so coefficients δk on the dummy variables capture 
earnings effects of displacement from up to 12 quarters before the job loss to up to 20 
quarters after the job loss.15  
To examine whether displacement effects vary between hi-tech workers and 
low-tech workers, the industry-level technology measure is interacted with each of 













   (2) 
where Techjt is the technology measure of industry j where person i works in quarter t. 
Techjt varies by industry and over time. The coefficients θk measure the differential 
displacement effects in industries with different levels of technology. If θk is 
estimated to be negative, that means hi-tech displaced workers suffer larger earnings 
losses in the kth quarter after displacement than low-tech workers. The technology 
variable is also interacted with quarterly dummies so that quarterly effects are 
allowed to be different between hi-tech workers and low-tech workers. Including the 
fixed effect αi avoids the potential bias which may arise if hi-tech workers have 
systematically higher earnings levels than low-tech workers, or if displaced workers 
have systematically different earnings levels than non-displaced workers.  
 
                                                 
15 To identify coefficients on the displacement dummy variables, earnings must be observed more than 12 quarters 
before displacement for some workers. In my sample, workers are displaced between 1992:1 and 2004:3 and their 
earnings are observed from 1989:1 to 2005:3.  
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2.5.2 Baseline Results 
Figures 2.3a through 2.3d present graphically the estimated results from 
equation (2), using the four alternative technology indicators. Lines labeled “hi-tech” 
depict the predicted quarterly earnings of a typical hi-tech displaced worker, who has 
the median level of technology of all hi-tech workers. Similarly, lines labeled “low-
tech” depict the predicted quarterly earnings, assuming the technology variable is 
equal to the median technology of all low-tech workers. For example, in Figure 2.3a, 
a typical hi-tech displaced worker loses $980 while a typical low-tech displaced 
worker loses $560 in the fourth quarter after displacement, relative to non-displaced 
workers. The pre-displacement average quarterly earnings are $7100 and $5600 for 
hi-tech and low-tech workers respectively, so their percentage earnings losses are 14 
percent and 10 percent respectively. Hi-tech workers’ earnings losses are four 
percentage points higher than low-tech workers in the fourth quarter after job loss.  
Shaded areas in Figures 2.3a denote time intervals where the corresponding 
coefficients of θk, the coefficient on the interaction terms between the technology 
variables and the displacement dummies, are statistically significantly different from 
zero at the five percent level, 16 in other words the displacement effects are 
statistically significantly different between hi-tech workers and low-tech workers in 
these quarters. Statistical significance exists both before and after displacement, 
indicating that hi-tech workers start to lose more than low-tech workers even before 
separating from the job. Possible reasons include that workers displaced are less 
skilled than their non-displaced counterparts and this difference is larger among hi-
                                                 
16 Standard errors are clustered at the level of an individual. 
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tech workers than among low-tech workers, or that the conditions of hi-tech firms 
ultimately experiencing displacements deteriorate to a greater extent than low-tech 
firms17. Since individual fixed effects are controlled in the model, time-invariant 
worker characteristics are ruled out as an explanation for the earnings differences 
before displacement. But time-varying worker characteristics could contribute to the 
earnings gap before job loss. For example, firms in hi-tech industries may tend to 
displace workers whose skills become obsolete and earnings trend down.  
Similar patterns also appear when other technology indicators are used, except 
in Figure 2.3c where hi-tech workers measured by R&D expenditures tend to suffer 
smaller earnings losses compared to low-tech workers. As indicated above, the R&D 
measure has a low correlation with other technology measures, suggesting that this 
measure may capture a different aspect of technology, such as the degree of 
innovation in the future rather than the current period.18 A comparison between Table 
A2.2c and A2.2d shows that many industries with a high fraction of scientists and 
engineers do not have intensive R&D activities. Examples include the transportation 
equipment manufacturing industry and the communication industry. This evidence 
suggests that the R&D measure only partially captures the technology level of an 
industry’s workers. Since computer usage, hi-tech equipment investment, and 
concentration of scientists and engineers are more directly related to the amount of 
workers involved in hi-tech jobs in an industry, results generated from these three 
                                                 
17 Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) states that earnings declines before displacement could be attributed to 
differences in unobserved characteristics between the ultimately displaced workers and the comparison group, or 
to differences in the productivity of the firms that ultimately displace workers. 
18 I also use percentile ranking rather than real values of R&D to estimate equation (2), but the estimated earnings 
losses differential between hi-tech and low-tech workers are similar to what Figure 3c shows. It is not the 
skewness of R&D measures that drive the results in Figure 3c. 
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measures are taken as a better estimate of the earnings losses of hi-tech displaced 
workers.                                                                                                                                                           
Figures 2.3a and 2.3b are very similar, both in the magnitude of earnings 
losses differentials and in the time intervals in which the differentials are significant. 
Using hi-tech investment as the technology measure, earnings losses are $620 (nine 
percent) for hi-tech workers and $290 (five percent) for low-tech workers in the fifth 
quarter after displacement. Disparities in earnings losses between hi-tech and low-
tech displaced workers are concentrated in the second and third year after the job loss 
and gradually diminish in the long run. In the fifteenth quarter after job loss, the 
earnings losses are $490 (seven percent) for hi-tech workers and $330 (six percent) 
for low-tech workers in Figure 2.3b, and the difference is statistically insignificant. 
The convergence between two lines of predicted earnings in the longer run in Figures 
2.3a and 2.3b suggests that hi-tech displaced workers experience faster earnings 
growth, which is likely the result of accumulation of new skills in a new position.19  
Figure 2.3d shows similar patterns of earnings losses as in Figures 2.3a and 
2.3b except in the fourth and fifth year after displacement. In Figure 2.3d, the 
earnings losses of hi-tech workers and low-tech workers do not tend to converge in 
the long run, contrary to what is shown in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b. This may be because 
workers displaced in industries with a large fraction of scientists and engineers have 
fewer opportunities or lower incentives to reinvest in new skills when reemployed, 
                                                 
19 Since the sample period ends at 2005:3, only workers displaced before 2000:3 have observed earnings in all the 
twenty quarters post displacement. The long-run earnings losses after job loss are thus estimated by a different 
sample, which includes only workers displaced in early years, than the short-run earnings losses upon 
displacement, where the sample includes workers displaced in all years between 1992:1 and 2004:3. To test 
whether this difference in sample composition affects the baseline results, Equation (2) is re-run for displaced 
workers who lose jobs before 2000:3 and the results are presented in Appendix Figure 2. The qualitative result 
replicates the baseline result in Figure 3a. 
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either because training is emphasized less in these industries or because these workers 
are older on average. The different paths of skill accumulation on the new job could 
lead to distinct long-term effects of displacement.  
 
2.5.3 Biases due to Missing Data 
The baseline results shown in Figure 2.3 are based on a sample of workers 
who do not have missing earnings for more than four continuous quarters and 
quarters with missing earnings are simply dropped from the analysis. As a result, the 
substantial earnings losses of workers not immediately reemployed after displacement 
are not included in the estimation. Figure 2.4 shows that for this baseline sample the 
fraction of workers with non-missing earnings after displacement is higher for hi-tech 
than for low-tech workers. The differences are statistically significant. To investigate 
whether earnings losses are still larger for hi-tech workers after taking into account 
workers not immediately reemployed after displacement, Equation (2) is estimated 
again on the baseline sample but with missing earnings replaced by zeros. The results 
are presented in Figures 2.5a-2.5d. The earnings losses are still larger for hi-tech 
workers, although the coefficients of θk are less significant in Figures 2.5a-2.5d than 
in Figures 2.3a-2.3d. Again, three of the four technology indicators generate similar 
results, whereas the results are again somewhat different when technology measure 
used is R&D.  
Since the technology measure of computer usage is relatively well-correlated 
with the measure of hi-tech investment and the fraction of scientists and engineers, 
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for the sake of brevity, only results from regressions where technology is measured 
by computer usage are presented below. 
As mentioned previously, workers with continual missing earnings for more 
than one year are excluded from the baseline analysis. This exclusion would bias the 
baseline results if hi-tech workers drop out of the data for different reasons than low-
tech workers. As an example, assume that hi-tech displaced workers are likely to be 
reemployed in other states, receiving positive earnings, while low-tech displaced 
workers are likely to be in long spells of unemployment or to withdraw from the labor 
market. In that case, excluding observations on these workers would overstate the 
earnings losses of hi-tech displaced workers, and understate the earnings losses of 
low-tech displaced workers.  
Table 2.2 displays the extent of attrition by showing the number of 
disappearing workers and the average quarterly earnings of the whole sample period 
for three exclusive categories of workers: permanent “disappearers” who disappear 
from the data at some point and never return to the data thereafter, temporary 
“disappearers” who have missing earnings for at least one calendar year and then 
return to the data, and stayers who have positive earnings for at least one quarter in 
each calendar year. Only workers in the third category are used in the baseline 
analysis. Temporary disappearers are excluded from the baseline analysis because 
these workers may be in long spells of non-employment before being reemployed, or 
they may be working in another state after leaving Maryland and then return to 
Maryland workforce again. According to Table 2.2, 60 percent of workers drop from 
the data either permanently or temporarily and their earnings are lower than stayers 
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on average. Earnings differentials between disappears and stayers are smaller among 
displaced workers than among non-displaced workers. These patterns are similar 
between hi-tech workers and low-tech workers, as shown in the lower two panels in 
Table 2.2. The similar patterns of attrition between hi-tech and low-tech workers 
imply that excluding disappearers may not affect the estimates of earnings losses 
differentials between hi-tech and low-tech displaced workers. Two formal tests below 
confirm that this conjecture is true. 
The first test takes advantage of the UI Data Exchange Program between 
Maryland and neighbor states. This program provides information on workers who 
once worked in Maryland and are now working in Washington D.C., Virginia, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio or West Virginia. Earnings of these 
workers are observed quarterly between 2004:3 and 2006:2 in the neighboring states. 
Among all displaced workers who permanently drop out from the MD UI wage data, 
about 16 percent are currently working in these eight neighbor states. This fraction is 
very similar between hi-tech workers and low-tech workers: 16.34 percent for hi-tech 
workers and 16.02 percent for low-tech workers20. The difference in this fraction 
between the two groups is not statistically significant.  
Displaced workers who are now working in neighbor states have higher 
earnings between 2004:3 and 2005:3 than displaced workers who are working in 
Maryland in these five quarters, as shown in Column (1) of Table 2.3. However, 
Column (2) of Table 2.3 shows that the pre-displacement average quarterly earnings 
                                                 
20 Hi-tech (low-tech) workers are defined as those spending more than half of their working life in industries with 
above (below) median level of computer usage. Using the other three technology measures, the fraction of 
reemployment in neighbor states are 17.26, 16.78 and 16.05 for hi-tech workers and 15.20, 18.61 and 16.82 for 
low-tech workers. None of the differences in this fraction between hi-tech and low-tech workers are statistically 
significant. 
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do not differ much between workers currently working in Maryland and those 
currently working in neighbor states, indicating that workers who move to work in 
other states are not a selected group of especially productive individuals. The higher 
post-displacement earnings of workers moving out of Maryland may be because they 
can take advantage of higher wage offers in other states by having fewer location 
restrictions. Comparing the upper and lower panels of Table 2.3 shows that these 
earnings trends of stayers and movers are similar between hi-tech workers and low-
tech workers.  
To confirm that workers who move to work outside Maryland after 
displacement do not affect the baseline results presented in the previous section, these 
workers who are now working in neighbor states were added to the original Maryland 
UI data and the regressions were rerun. Their missing earnings between the quarter 
when they disappear from the Maryland UI data and the quarter they are observed 
again in other states are calculated in the following way. Earnings in the four quarters 
before they disappear are averaged as “starting earnings” and earnings between 
2004:3 and 2005:3 are averaged as “ending earnings”. Earnings growth calculated 
from the “starting earnings” and “ending earnings” is then used to extrapolate 
earnings in between.21 The results of rerunning the regressions using this expanded 
data set are shown in Figure 2.6a. The earnings trends of hi-tech and low-tech 
displaced workers in Figure 2.6a are almost identical to those in Figure 2.3a, 
                                                 
21 Extrapolating earnings in this way would underestimate earnings losses of displaced workers if workers rehired 
in neighbor states suffer earnings drop upon displacement. But as long as this unobserved earnings drop is similar 
between hi-tech and low-tech workers, this extrapolation would not affect the estimation of different earnings 
losses between the two groups. An approach to get around the problem of not knowing workers’ earnings between 
the time they drop out from MD data and the time their earnings are observed in neighbor states is to limit the 
“rehired worker” sample to workers who drop out from MD data in more recent years. Among workers dropping 
out from MD data in 2003, the fraction of being observed in neighbor states after 2004:3 is slightly higher than 
among workers who drop out from MD data in earlier years, with the former equal to 16.6% and the latter equal to 
14.1%.  
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suggesting that disappeared workers who are rehired in other states after displacement 
do not affect my baseline results.  
Unlike the 16 percent disappearing workers who are reemployed in neighbor 
states, other workers who drop out from the Maryland UI data cannot be tracked. 
Without knowing the actual values of their missing earnings, there is no way to 
estimate the true earnings losses of these workers. To get around this problem, an 
upper bound of the earnings losses differential is estimated as a second test for the 
attrition bias. For hi-tech displaced workers who drop out from the data, their missing 
earnings are replaced by their usual positive earnings, as described in Appendix 2C; 
for low-tech displaced workers who drop out from the data, their missing earnings are 
replaced by zeroes. Such an imputation exaggerates the earnings losses of low-tech 
workers and shrinks the earnings losses of hi-tech workers. If the upper bound 
earnings losses differential estimated in this way is still negative, then it is assured 
that the estimated larger earnings losses of hi-tech displaced workers in the baseline 
results are not driven by excluding workers disappearing from the data.  
The attrition bias test is conducted for both permanent “disappearers” and 
temporary “disappearers”. A detailed discussion of how the earnings are imputed is 
presented in Appendix 2C. After making the imputations, equation (2) is estimated 
again and the results are shown in Figures 2.6b through 2.6c. In Figure 2.6b, where 
permanent “disappearers” are brought back to the original data set, hi-tech workers 
still show larger earnings losses in the first two years after displacement, although 
most quarters have insignificant coefficients. In Figure 2.6c, it is shown that the 
baseline results are also preserved after temporary disappearers’ missing earnings are 
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imputed. These findings confirm that patterns in Figures 2.3 are not spurious results 
driven by excluding large number of disappearers from the data. 
 
2.5.4 Controlling for Earning Ranks 
Ideally, hi-tech workers should be identified by both their industries and 
occupations because some workers in hi-tech industries do not hold hi-tech 
occupations. Unfortunately, information on occupations is unavailable in the MD UI 
data, so workers’ earnings are used to define their occupations.22 Workers with 
earnings higher than the 75th percentile of their industry’s earnings distribution are 
very likely to be chief executives or senior managers. On the other end, workers with 
earnings below the 25th percentile of their industry’s earnings distribution are mostly 
administrative workers or blue-collar workers. Therefore, workers are divided into a 
high-earnings group, a mid-earnings group, and a low-earnings group, using the 75 
percentile and the 25 percentile of the industry earnings distribution as cutoffs.23  
Equation (2) is estimated separately for these three groups and results are 
shown in Figures 2.7a-2.7c. Among high-earners, hi-tech displaced workers suffer 
smaller earnings losses than low-tech workers, but the differences are not statistically 
significant in almost all quarters. Post-displacement earnings of hi-earners in hi-tech 
industries fully recover in about one year after job loss. These results are consistent 
                                                 
22 An alternative is to constrain the sample to workers in hi-tech industries only and define workers with earnings 
above a certain level as hi-tech workers. The problem with conducting such an exercise is that hi-tech workers are 
defined by a dummy variable rather than a continuous variable. There is not much variation in such a dummy 
variable within person and even in cases where within-person variation does exist, it is likely to be due to 
measurement error and may not reflect a true switch between hi-tech and low-tech position. Considering that 
within-person variation is used for identification in fixed effect model, this alternative approach is not useful for 
estimating hi-tech displaced workers’ earnings losses relative to low-tech displaced workers.  
23 In defining these three groups, workers’ earnings are compared with their industry earnings in each quarter. If a 
worker is a high-earner in more than half of the time during the sample period, then this worker is defined as a 
high-earner. The same approach applies to mid-earners and low-earners. 
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with the hypothesis that managers have larger fractions of general human capital 
which can be carried over across jobs more easily.  
Among mid-earners and low-earners, hi-tech displaced workers suffer larger 
overall earnings losses after job loss. The result for low-earners is contrary to 
expectations because low-earners in hi-tech industries are likely to do non-hi-tech 
jobs and should mainly have general human capital. A closer examination of Figure 
2.7b and Figure 2.7c reveals that earnings of hi-tech workers and low-tech workers 
tend to eventually converge among mid-earners, while this convergence in earnings 
does not happen for low-earners. If hi-tech workers’ larger earnings losses are due to 
human capital depreciation or low transferability of skills, then we should observe 
earnings to recover gradually after displacement with the accumulation of new skills 
in the new job and therefore the earnings losses should gradually converge between 
hi-tech and low-tech workers. The lack of convergence in earnings losses among low-
earners suggests that the reasons underlying the earnings losses differentials might 
differ for low-earners than for mid-earners. What low-earners lose after displacement 
in hi-tech industries may be a wage premium that is not associated with higher labor 
market skills. Employers in hi-tech industries may be more willing to pay such wage 
premiums to lower the probability of worker turnover or to avoid shirking. An 
examination of the Census 2000 data shows that secretaries and receptionists in the IT 
industry have higher annual earnings as well as higher hourly wages than secretaries 
and receptionists in other industries. This industry wage premium is not driven by 
higher education or more potential experience (age-6-years of education) because the 
wage premium remains the same even after these two variables are used as controls.  




2.6 Reasons for Hi-Tech Displaced Workers’ Larger Earnings Losses 
2.6.1 Is it driven by the 2000-2001 recession? 
The dot-com bubble burst in 2000 marked the end of the boom in many hi-
tech industries. From 2000 to 2003, average employment decreased by 21 percent in 
IT manufacturing industries and by 17 percent in IT services industries; while the 
employment drops in non-IT manufacturing and non-IT services industries were two 
percent and 0.5 percent respectively.24 Other hi-tech industries also experienced large 
job losses in the 2000-2001 recession and many of them had only moderate 
employment recoveries in the post-recession period.25  
To examine whether the baseline results are driven by the 2000-2001 
recession and the following sluggish employment growth, equation (2) is estimated 
separately for person-quarter observations during 1989-1999 and person-quarter 
observations during 2000-2005. The results are presented in Figures 2.8a and 2.8b. 
Hi-tech displaced workers have significantly larger earnings losses in periods before 
2000 but not after. This result is likely explained by the fact that non-displaced hi-
tech workers have steeper earnings growth before 2000 than after 2000, resulting in 
workers displaced in the 1990s suffering larger foregone earnings than workers 
displaced after 2000. These results suggest that the baseline results are not driven by 
the weaker labor market in hi-tech sectors after 2000.  
                                                 
24 These numbers are from Hotchkiss (2005). 
25 See Groshen and Potter (2003). 
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2.6.2 Job Mobility following Displacement 
Stevens (1997) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996) found that displaced workers 
who change jobs more frequently after displacement have larger earnings losses 
because their earnings recovery process is interrupted. In the Maryland UI data, a 
review of the number of job changes after displacement shows that hi-tech workers 
have fewer job changes than low-tech workers. The former has an average of 3.4 job 
changes while the latter has an average of 4.1 job changes. Therefore, hi-tech 
workers’ greater earnings losses cannot be explained by more frequent job mobility 




This chapter explores whether hi-tech displaced workers have larger earnings 
losses than low-tech displaced workers. Using individual-level longitudinal data set 
linked with industry level technology measures, this study finds that initial earnings 
losses after job loss are greater for hi-tech workers than for low-tech workers. In the 
long run, earnings recover faster in post-displacement period for hi-tech displaced 
workers when technology is measured by computer usage or hi-tech equipment 
investment.  
The kind of government assistance program most helpful to hi-tech displaced 
workers depends on the reasons for their larger losses. For example, training 
programs may be more helpful than financial support, if hi-tech displaced workers 
lose earnings because their skills depreciate. Job search services may be more 
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desirable if hi-tech skills are too specific to be easily transferred to new jobs or good 
matches are hard to find. Future research, both theoretical and empirical, should 
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Compared to many other countries in the world, the U.S. population has 
included a relatively large proportion of immigrants and this proportion has increased 
dramatically in recent decades. In 1970, 9.6 million persons, or 5 percent of the U.S. 
population were foreign-born; whereas in 2000, 32.9 million U.S. people, or 11.7 
percent of the population were foreign-born. The labor market skill of immigrants is 
an important concern in assessing the overall contribution of immigrants to the U.S. 
economy.  
Skills of female immigrants are measured along both observed and 
unobserved dimensions in this chapter. Observed skills include English proficiency 
and educational attainment, two major components of human capital that affect 
immigrants’ performance in the US labor market. Unobserved skill is estimated using 
regression-adjusted wages, controlling for education, experience, health, marital 
status, and residence area. Based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor 
markets, the wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor. This implies that 
regression-adjusted wages capture workers’ unobserved characteristics that affect 
their productivity. Examples of these characteristics include quality of schooling, self-
motivation, and commitment to work. Quality changes of female immigrant cohorts 
over time are measured by comparing the quality, either directly observed or 
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indirectly estimated, of immigrant cohorts who arrived in the U.S. in different time 
periods.  
A great deal of literature has examined the quality changes of male immigrant 
cohorts. Early research, such as Borjas (1985, 1995), Funkhouser and Trejo (1995) 
and Yuengert (1994), has shown that the skills of male immigrants decreased across 
successive cohorts from the 1950s to the 1980s. One major contributing factor to the 
quality decline of male immigrants is the shift of origin country from Europe to Asia 
and Latin America. Borjas (1992) and LaLonde and Topel (1991) demonstrate that, 
after controlling for changes in source country composition, all quality declines 
disappear. Using more recent data, Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998) and 
Lubotsky (2000) show that the secular decline in skills of male immigrants halted in 
the mid-1980s and that male immigrants exhibited a rise in quality from the late 
1980s through the 1990s.  
Little attention has been devoted to female immigrants’ earnings or skill 
changes, probably because of a lack of information on women’s real working 
experience. As far as I know, the only research studying female immigrants’ skill 
changes is Funkhouser and Trejo (1998), which shows no quality decline across 
successive cohorts of female immigrants, after controlling for education, experience, 
marital status, etc. Despite the few studies on labor market skills of female 
immigrants, the important role female immigrants play in the host-country economy 
has been emphasized in the Family Investment Model (Duleep and Sanders 1993). 
Their research demonstrates that wives in immigrant families work to finance their 
husbands’ initial investments in U.S.-specific human capital during their first few 
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years in the U.S. to maximize the family permanent income. This view of 
immigrants’ earnings from a family perspective illustrates that female immigrants’ 
human capital is a critical component affecting immigrants’ contribution to the U.S. 
economy.  
The analysis presented here of skill changes among female immigrants is 
helpful in addressing a number of issues. Examination of the labor market skills of 
female immigrants facilitates comparisons of human capital between female 
immigrants and male immigrants. Using the same data and measurement methods as 
Borjas (1985) provides a consistent basis for comparing the quality changes of female 
immigrants with those of male immigrants studied in Borjas’s work. Earnings 
differentials by gender among immigrants have been studied far less than those 
among the native-born. 
The study of female immigrants’ quality changes across cohorts is important 
in helping to interpret the cross-sectional data analysis that is often used to estimate 
immigrants’ assimilation rates, namely the wage growth rate with years of stay in the 
U.S. Because of the lack of longitudinal data sets for immigrants, most research 
studying immigrants uses cross-sectional data. As noted most importantly by Borjas 
(1985), cross-sectional analyses would lead to biased estimates of the assimilation 
rate if immigrants' skills change across cohorts. For example, if immigrants arriving 
in 1985 have higher skills than those arriving in 1995, an analysis using Census 2000 
alone would show that immigrants with 15 years of stay in the U.S. have better labor 
market performance than those with five years of stay in the U.S., even if there is no 
assimilation at all. The methodology and estimates presented here on changing 
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patterns across cohorts of female immigrants can be helpful in assessing to what 
extent cross-sectional estimation of the assimilation rate is biased for female 
immigrants.  
Many factors may contribute to changes in the human capital of immigrants to 
the U.S. Quality changes across cohorts of female immigrants could be driven by 
changes in the U.S. demand for immigrants as well as changes in the supply of 
immigrants in their countries of origin. Immigration laws in the U.S. affect the kinds 
of immigrants selected into the U.S. and thus affect the average quality of certain 
immigrant cohorts. For example, under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 
1965, individual visas were granted giving priority to family reunification. 
Immigrants who could not migrate to the U.S. under an occupational visa could then 
enter on the basis of kinship. This kind of change in the law would presumably 
decrease the skill level of immigrants. In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) was passed to control unauthorized immigration to the United States. 
This act reduced the number of illegal immigrants who are usually lower-skilled 
workers and would therefore have a positive effect on average immigrant skills. The 
impact of these laws may vary across different groups of immigrants. For example, 
IRCA (1986) may have the greatest impact on Mexican immigrants. 
On the supply side, trends in immigrant quality across cohorts are related to 
the economic incentives for migration. Individuals choose to migrate only when the 
difference between their expected earnings in the U.S. and those in their home 
countries could compensate for migration costs. Lower transportation costs and 
simpler procedures for applying to go abroad as some countries open their doors 
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wider reduce the overall migration costs and make migration profitable for a greater 
number of low-earning individuals. In addition, the kind of individuals within a home 
country who choose to migrate depends on the skill price in the home country relative 
to that in the U.S. As discussed in Borjas (1987), immigrants are mainly drawn from 
the upper end of the earnings distribution in the home country if the destination 
country has a larger variance in earnings than the home country, everything else being 
equal, and vice versa. This is because countries with low earnings variance tend to tax 
high-earners to subsidize low-earners, which drives high-earners to a destination 
country with a higher earnings variance to benefit from the higher skill premium. 
More immigrants coming from countries with greater income inequality than that of 
the U.S. would decrease average immigrant quality because more lower-end 
individuals would be included. In summary, the quality of immigrants in the U.S. 
would change over time because of changes in migration-related costs or changes in 
the earnings dispersion in the home country and in the U.S.  
Because the supply-side and demand-side influences on immigrants may be 
offsetting, theory does not offer an unambiguous prediction on the direction of 
immigrants’ quality changes. Therefore, the net result of these factors on the changes 
of female immigrant human capital is an empirical question. 
This paper examines changes across cohorts in female immigrants’ labor 
market skills using data from the U.S. Decennial Censuses of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
2000. Census data shows that, across cohorts of female immigrants, English 
proficiency at entry has not changed and average years of education has increased. To 
estimate unobserved quality changes, differences in regression-adjusted wages are 
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calculated between successive cohorts of female immigrants using the methodology 
in Borjas (1985). His regression model is extended somewhat to address the potential 
estimation biases caused by women's discontinuous work history. The empirical 
results show that, unlike male immigrants whose unobserved skills declined across 
successive cohorts from the 1960s to the 1970s, the skills of successive cohorts of 
many female immigrant increased during this period. From the 1970s to the 1990s, 
Asian and Mexican female immigrants both show quality declines but the reasons 
vary. Finally, the skills of new cohorts of female immigrants have not changed much 
in the most recent decade. 
 
3.2 Changes in Observed Dimensions of Human Capital 
3.2.1 English Proficiency 
The English proficiency of immigrants is a critical component of human 
capital for success in the U.S. labor market. Previous research has shown that 
immigrants who are proficient in the dominant language of the host country have 
higher earnings than those who are not (McManus, Gould and Welch (1983), 
Dustmann (1994), Chiswick and Miller (1995), Carliner (1996), Berman and Lang 
(2000)). For example, Chiswick and Miller (1995) found that English fluency is 
associated with five percent higher earnings among immigrants in Australia. This 
positive correlation is higher for immigrants from non-English speaking countries and 
is increasing over time. Carliner (1996) shows that better English skill is rewarded by 
higher earnings in the U.S. at a similar rate as the return to additional years of 
education. All else being equal, male immigrants who speak English “very well” earn 
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9.6 percent more than those who speak English well and male immigrants with 12 
years of schooling earn 8 percent more than those with 11 years of schooling. 
Information on the English proficiency of female immigrants in this paper is 
taken from the U.S. Decennial Censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000. Immigrants are 
defined as individuals who are born outside the United States26. English proficiency is 
measured using a self-rated27 response to the Census question “How well does the 
respondent speak English?” Responses fall into one of five categories: “only speaking 
English”, “speaking English very well”, “speaking English well”, “speaking English 
not very well”, and “not speaking English at all”. Table 3.1 presents two indicators of 
English proficiency: fraction of immigrants speaking only English or speaking 
English very well and fraction of immigrants not speaking English at all. All results 
in this paper are weighted by person weights provided by the Census Bureau. 
Census measures of the English proficiency for female immigrants by race 
and ethnicity are presented in Table 3.1, for the period 1980 – 2000. Among 
immigrants who have been in the U.S. for five years or less, 36.5 percent spoke 
English at least very well in 1980, with this number increasing only slightly over time 
(37.9 percent in 1990 and 38.9 percent in 2000). The lower panel of Table 3.1 shows 
the other end of the distribution – the percentage of female immigrants not speaking 
                                                 
26 This definition of immigrant is widely used in the literature on immigrants’ economic performance in the U.S. 
Another definition of immigrant, used by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), is all legal 
permanent residents. The latter definition can not be used with Census data because information on legal status is 
not available. Besides, the INS defined immigrants do not include foreign students and recent refugees, who are 
very likely to become permanent residents later.  
27 There is evidence that self-reported second language skills are highly correlated with other more objective 
measures (Spolsky (1989) and Le Blank and Painchard (1985)) and are powerful predictors of immigrants’ labor 
market performance (Carliner (1996), Berman and Lang (2000)), which suggests that they can capture the real 
language ability of immigrants. This self reported English skill in the Census is widely used in the literature of 
immigrants’ language assimilation (Carliner (1996), Carliner (2000), Chiswick et al. (1995), Chiswick et al. 
(2006)). However, Anderson (1982) found that the correlation of self-assessment with object test scores differs by 
country of origin and Shuy (1981) reported that some respondents may be unable to assess language issues 
precisely. 
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English at all. About 17 percent of female immigrants with five years or less of 
residence in the U.S. do not speak any English. This proportion also stays almost the 
same from 1980 to 2000. The seemingly stable trends in language ability hide large 
variations across ethnic groups. Row two through Row five in the upper and lower 
panels of Table 3.1 present the different trends in English proficiency for four groups: 
White immigrants (non-Hispanic, non-Asian), Black immigrants (non-Hispanic, non-
Asian), Asian immigrants and Mexican immigrants. Asian and Mexican immigrants 
exhibit steadily increasing language ability, reflected by both increasing fractions of 
people speaking English at least very well and decreasing fractions of people 
speaking no English. By contrast, Black immigrants show a constant decline in 
English ability. There is no obvious trend for White immigrants.   
By comparing the language ability of immigrant cohorts who have been in the 
country different lengths of time, the changes over time in language ability – the 
language assimilation process – can be determined.28 According to Figure 3.1, 37 
percent of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. during 1975-79 spoke only English or 
spoke English very well during their first five years in the U.S., while the fraction for 
this cohort increased to 55 percent after 10 years and to 57 percent after 20 years. 
This language adaptation process is faster for earlier cohorts of immigrants than for 
more recent cohorts. The dotted line in Figure 3.1 shows that the cohort arriving 
during 1985-89 experienced a 14 percentage point increase in English proficiency 
over 10 years, while the solid line shows that the cohort arriving during 1975-79 had 
                                                 
28 This is based on the assumptions that immigrants who migrate out from this country have similar language skills 
on average as those who stay and that self-reporting norms do not change with lengths of stay in the U.S. Stevens 
(1994) and Chiswick et al. (2006) have provided evidence that immigrants returning to their home countries have 
similar language abilities as those staying in the U.S.  
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an increase of 18 percentage points. This slowing down of language assimilation rate 
is also true for other cohorts not shown Figure 3.1.  
 
3.2.2 Educational Attainment 
Another critical factor affecting immigrants’ quality is educational attainment. 
Table 3.2 shows the changes over time in educational attainment of female 
immigrants and natives. Because educational attainment has increased for women in 
almost all countries in recent decades, educational attainment of the native born is 
reported as a benchmark. The sample is restricted to individuals older than age 24, an 
age at which most people have completed their college education, if any, so that 
changes in the distribution of age at migration would have a minimal effect on 
changes in educational attainment across cohorts. 
The top panel in Table 3.2 presents the percentage of high school dropouts 
among immigrant and native women over time. In 1980, 45 percent of newly arrived 
female immigrants were high school dropouts. By 2000, only 28 percent of female 
immigrants did not have a high school diploma. The percentage of high school 
dropouts decreased by more than one-third over these two decades. Among female 
natives, there is a smaller proportion of high school dropouts, with only 13 percent 
lacking a high school diploma. Moreover, natives experienced a 60 percent decline in 
high school dropouts from 1980 to 2000, a much higher rate than that of the 
immigrants during the same time period. The relatively slow decline of high school 
dropouts among immigrants may be driven by the rapid increase of Mexican 
immigrants with low levels of education on average. As shown in the top panel of 
  49  
Table 3.2, the percentage of high school dropouts among Mexican immigrants is 
more than twice as large as that of other immigrants, and the number of Mexican 
immigrants in 2000 is more than four times the number in 1980. All three other 
immigrant groups exhibit a similar decline rate of high school dropouts as that of 
natives. 
Although immigrants have a larger fraction of high school dropouts and this 
fraction has declined more slowly for immigrants than for natives, immigrants’ 
educational attainment at the other end of the education ladder – college graduation – 
is as good as, if not better, than for natives, at least on average. The middle panel of 
Table 3.2 shows that, among newly arrived immigrants, the fraction with a college 
degree is higher than that of natives and the growth rate of this fraction is similar 
between immigrants and natives. The high fraction of college graduates among 
immigrants is driven by highly educated white and Asian immigrants. In contrast, the 
growth rate in the fraction of college graduates among black and Mexican immigrants 
is faster than that of natives, although their levels have remained below that of natives. 
Most immigrants migrate at relatively young ages, so the population of newly 
arrived immigrants has a larger fraction of young people than the native population, 
which may drive up the average educational attainment of immigrants relative to the 
natives due to the secular increase in college enrollment rates. To control for this 
difference in age composition, the native sample is reweighted using the age 
distribution of the newly arrived immigrants and the weighted average of educational 
attainment calculated for the native sample. The last row in the middle panel of Table 
3.2 shows the results of this adjustment. Immigrants still exhibit a higher fraction of 
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college graduates and a similar growth rate over time compared to the natives, when 
the age distribution of the immigrant sample is imposed on natives.  
The top two panels of Table 3.2 demonstrate that, in terms of educational 
attainment, recently arrived immigrants are worse than natives at the low end of the 
education distribution and better than natives at the high end. The bottom panel of 
Table 3.2 complements the upper two panels by depicting an overall picture of the 
average educational attainment between immigrants and natives. This bottom panel 
shows that average years of education29 attained by immigrants is lower than that of 
the natives but the growth rate across cohorts is similar between the two groups. 
Asian female immigrants stand out by showing a remarkable improvements in 
education across cohorts, starting at a lower than native educational attainment in 
1980 and ending at a much higher level than natives in 2000. This improvement in 
education among Asian immigrants offsets the negative effects on immigrants’ 
average education caused by the increase of Mexican immigrants. 
Compared to the educational attainment changes for male immigrants in Table 
3.2 in Borjas (1995), female immigrants studied in this paper show a larger decline 
across cohorts in the fraction who are high school dropouts and faster growth in the 
fraction who are college graduates from 1980 to 1990.30 As presented in Figures 3.2 
and 3.3, male immigrants show no decline in high school dropouts and a flatter 
growth in college graduates than male natives. These differences in trends result in a 
                                                 
29 “Years of education” is established based on the education attainment variable in Census. The recoding 
mechanics are described in Appendix 3A. 
30 The sample in Borjas (1994) Table 4 is not exactly the same as that in my Table 2. Borjas only studied men aged 
25-64, who work in the civilian sector, who are not self-employed, and who do not reside in group quarters; while 
the sample in my Table 2 are women aged older than 24. However, fraction of respondents in military, reporting 
self-employed, and residing in group quarters is so small that it may not affect the comparison. Moreover, there is 
only little difference in age distribution at ages older than 64 across Census years so the different age ranges 
between my sample and Borjas’ sample may not matter as well. 
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larger improvement across cohorts of education among female immigrants than their 
male counterparts, relative to respective U.S.-born individuals. 
 
3.3 Changes in Unobserved Dimensions of Human Capital 
3.3.1 Framework 
Language proficiency and educational attainment are important components 
of human capital affecting the wage of immigrants, and measures of these factors are 
included in the Census data. There are, however, other unobserved factors 
determining how well immigrants perform in the US labor market, such as schooling 
quality, self-motivation and other personal characteristics. This section investigates 
the trend in these unobserved dimensions of immigrant quality. A measure of these 
unobserved effects is based on regression-adjusted wages, which are predicted wages 
after controlling for observed factors such as education and experience, as developed 
by Borjas (1985). This approach makes it possible to compare the predicted wages of 
two cohorts, holding everything else equal. Implementing this approach requires the 
use of multiple years of Census data. The repeated cross-sectional data permits a 
comparison between two cohorts that have the same length of stay in the U.S. For 
example, to examine the quality changes between people migrating during 1965-1969 
versus those migrating during 1975-1979, an estimate of the earlier cohort’s predicted 
wages in 1970 is compared to an estimate of the later cohort’s predicted wages in 
1980. Both cohorts will have at most five years of residence in the U.S. when 
observed in each respective Census. Specific cohorts of immigrants are compared 
between Census 1970 and Census 1980, between Census 1980 and Census 1990, and 
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between Census 1990 and Census 2000. The following introduction of the estimation 
framework describes the comparison between Census 1970 and Census 1980 as an 
example. Comparisons of later cohorts using later years of Census data replicate the 
same logic. 
Immigrants are categorized as cohorts by their arrival years reported in 
Census. In Census 1970, all immigrants can be grouped into four cohorts: arrivals in 
1965-69, arrivals in 1960-64, arrivals in 1950-59 and immigrants arriving prior to 
1950. In Census 1980, two more cohorts are added: arrivals in 1975-79 and arrivals in 
1970-74. Using dummy variables to indicate these cohorts, two regressions are 
estimated for Census 1970 and Census 1980 respectively: 
lnw70 =X β70 + α70,65D65 + α70,60D60 + α70,50D50 + α70,40D40+ε70,                         (1) 
lnw80 =X β80 + α80,75D75 + α80,70D70 + α80,65D65 + α80,60D60 +α80,50D50+α80,40D40+ε80,  (2) 
   
where the subscripts 70 and 80 indicate the Census year. The dependent variable is 
log wage in the year before Census, calculated as annual earnings divided by total 
hours worked last year. Total hours worked last year is a multiplication of weeks 
worked last year and hours worked per week31. X is a vector of explanatory variables 
including education, potential work experience (equal to age-6-years of education), 
potential work experience squared, marital status, number of own children in the 
household, marital status interacted with potential experience, marital status 
interacted with potential experience square, health, and residence area.  
                                                 
31 Hours worked per week is reported as weekly working hours in the Census week in Census 1970 and is reported 
as usual hours worked in the past year in Census 1980 through 2000. Hours worked per week and weeks worked 
last year are coded as intervals in Census 1970. Mid points of these intervals are used in calculation. A detailed 
discussion of the definitions of all dependent and independent variables is in Appendix 3A.  
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Since women often have interrupted work histories (Mincer and Polachek 
1974), the potential work experience calculated as “age-6-years of education” does 
not measure accurately the actual amount of work experience of women. The variable 
“number of children” is included to proxy the amount of time women stay out of the 
labor force. Marital status is interacted with potential work experience to allow for 
different wage effects of potential experience based on marital status, further 
controlling for the possible difference in labor market attachment between married 
women and single women. Arriving cohorts are indicated by the set of dummy 
variables Dk. For example, D65=1 if an immigrant migrated during 1965-69. All the 
four cohorts in Census 1970 and all the six cohorts in Census 1980 are captured in 
equations (1) and (2). Intercepts are omitted in the regressions so that coefficients of 
all the cohort dummies are identified.  
Using estimated coefficients from regressions (1) and (2), predicted wages for 
each cohort are generated. Three pairs of across-cohort comparisons are conducted 
between Census 1970 and 1980. Cohorts 65-69, 60-64 and 50-59 in Census 1970 are 
compared with cohorts 75-79, 70-74 and 60-6932 in Census 1980. Considering the 
comparison between cohort 65-69 and cohort 75-79 as an example, their predicted log 
wages are calculated as:  
(4)                            .ˆˆˆln










By definition, cohort 65-69 in Census 1970 and cohort 75-79 in Census 1980 
both have zero to five years of residence in the U.S. Other explanatory variables are 
                                                 
32 The cohort 50-59 is at a ten-year interval while cohorts 60-64 and 65-69 are two five-year intervals. To facilitate 
the comparison between Census 1970 and 1980, a predicted wage is calculated for cohort 60-69 by averaging the 
predicted wage of cohort 60-64 and cohort 65-69. 
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held constant for these two cohorts by imposing the same X  in the calculation. 
The X  used in equations (3) and (4) is the average of the X  of cohort 1965-69 in 
Census 1970 and the X of cohort 1975-79 in Census 198033. Using the same X  and 
holding constant the length of stay in the U.S. assures that the differences between 
two cohorts' predicted wages are not driven by observed factors included in X.  
Changes in macroeconomic conditions (which may also lead to a difference 
between ln 65,70Ŵ  and ln 75,80Ŵ ) are controlled for by comparing immigrants' wages to 
native workers' wages. For example, a higher return to education throughout the 
overall labor market in 1980 than in 1970 would make the predicted wage of a worker 
in 1980 higher than that of a worker in 1970, even if the two workers are exactly the 
same in both the observed and the unobserved dimensions of human capital. To 
remove this effect of changes in overall labor market condition, native workers are 
used as a benchmark group (Borjas 1985), based on the assumption that the wage 
effects of human capital variables change in the same way between immigrants and 
natives34. The change in unobserved human capital between cohort 65-69 and cohort 
75-79 is thus defined as:    
(5)           )],ˆˆ()ˆˆ[()]ˆˆ()ˆˆ[(









    
                                                 
33 X means of other samples are also tried. Setting X means equal to X means of cohort 1965-69 measured in 
Census 1980 (as used in Borjas 1985) leads to similar results.  
34 The estimated returns to observed human capital characteristics may change differently between immigrants and 
natives. For example, wages of nurses have increased over time, so predicted wages of Filipino women who are 
largely concentrated in nursing jobs would increase over time even if their skills do not improve. Another example 
is that the different labor market effect of economic recession between immigrants and natives could lead to 
different estimated returns. To pin down the extent to which differences in predicted wages are caused by 
differences in the quantity of human capital rather than the price of human capital, one could perform 
decomposition as in Juhn, Murphy and Perce (1989). This is left for future research. 
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where the superscripts I and N stand for immigrants and natives respectively.35 
Predicted wages of native workers are obtained using the same X described as above, 
together with the estimated coefficients from the regressions of native worker 
samples36: 
7)(       intercept ln














The data used in the following regressions are drawn from the 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000 U.S. Census. The sample selection criteria require that: (1) the 
individual was between the ages of 1837 and 64; (2) the information on weeks worked 
last year and hours (or usual hours) worked per week was not missing; (3) the 
individual was not self-employed or out of the labor force; (4) the individual did not 
reside in group quarters. Table 3.3 shows the fraction of individuals excluded from 
the following regressions because of the above sample selection criteria. Fewer 
immigrants than natives are excluded for not belonging to the working age range – 
ages 18 to 64 – because younger and older people are less likely to migrate. 
Immigrants are more likely than natives to be self-employed or not participating in 
the labor force.38 But among those who work and receive positive wages, immigrants 
                                                 
35 Changes in immigrants' predicted wages relative to those of natives are also influenced by changes in 
discriminatory attitudes against immigrants and changes in the composition of ethnical groups.  
36 An alternative method to estimate the predicted wages by cohorts is to pool data of immigrants and natives from 
all four Census years and to run a single regression which includes on the right hand side native dummies, cohort 
dummies, and length of stay in the U.S. Such a single regression constrains that the coefficients on X are all the 
same across Census years and between immigrants and natives. Adding interaction terms between duration of stay 
and cohort dummies allows the cohort effects to differ by length of stay.   
37 Eighteen instead of twenty four is used as the lower bound of the age restriction so that the newly arrived high 
school dropouts are captured. 
38 The sample used for regression includes working women only. Women's self-selection into the labor force is 
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are less likely to have missing information on working weeks or hours. On average, 
working women with no information on working weeks or hours are less educated 
and younger than other working women. Wages for all years are defined in 2000 
dollars, by converting nominal wages in 1970, 1980 and 1990 into 2000 dollars by the 
Consumer Price Index. Workers with wages lower than $1 per hour or higher than 
$200 per hour are excluded. These outliers constitute less than one percent of the 
sample.  
Immigrants from different countries of origin have very different 
socioeconomic status and there is evidence that the shift of immigrant composition 
from white European immigrants to Asians and Mexicans is a major contributor to 
the change of male immigrant quality over time (Borjas (1992), LaLonde and Topel 
(1991)). To single out the across-cohort quality changes due to changes in country of 
origin mix, the following analysis examines female immigrants separately for four 
major immigrant groups39: White immigrants (non-Hispanic, non-Asian), Black 
immigrants (non-Hispanic, non-Asian), Asian immigrants and Mexican immigrants. 
Immigrants are compared to their native counterparts in the same ethnic groups. For 
example, Asian immigrants are compared with natives reporting Asian race and 
Mexican immigrants are compared with natives of Mexican origin.40   
                                                                                                                                           
investigated using Heckman's two-step model (Heckman 1979). However, the lack of valid exclusion restriction 
from the Census data introduces large noises into the estimation and leads to unreliable results. 
39 These four groups are generated by aggregating immigrants from very different countries into specific ethnic 
groups. Changes in the origin country composition within each group could affect estimated changes in immigrant 
quality. This issue is particularly severe for the Asian group because Asian countries are very diverse, ranging 
from developed countries such as Japan and Singapore to less developed countries such as Vietnam and the 
Philippines.  
40 There is debate in the literature as regard to whether immigrants should be compared to white natives (the 
typical native US individual) or to natives with the same ethnicity. My paper studies immigrants’ wages, with 
natives used as a control group to account for the general macroeconomic effects. So I think it is more appropriate 
to compare immigrants with the most similar natives, the natives with the same ethnicity, considering the large 
difference in socioeconomic statuses between ethnic groups even among natives.  
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Figures 3.4a through 3.4d present raw log wages measured after at most five 
years in the U.S. for immigrant cohorts 1965-69, 1975-79, 1985-89, 1995-99, 
together with raw log wages of female natives who are in the labor market during the 
same time periods. White and Black immigrants show higher wages than their native 
counterparts while Asian and Mexican immigrants have lower wages than their native 
counterparts. All four immigrant groups had lower wages among cohort 1975-79 than 
among cohort 1965-69. From cohort 1975-79 to cohort 1995-99, wages become 
higher for White, Black and Asian immigrants, and the rate of wage increase is 
similar to their native counterparts.  
Figure 3.4 confirms that different ethnic and country groups have quite 
different wage levels. Mexican immigrants have the lowest average wages among all 
immigrants in all Census years. Asian immigrants’ average wage is higher than that 
of Black immigrants and Mexican immigrants but is lower compared to that of native 
Asians. The language barrier is a possible reason. The large linguistic distance 
between English and most Asian languages is a hurdle limiting Asian immigrants’ 
assimilation into the U.S. labor market while language is not an obstacle for Asian 
natives. 
 
3.3.3 Empirical Results 
Table 3.4 presents estimated coefficients in wage regressions of immigrants 
and natives in Census 1970 and 1980 (Equations (1), (2), (6) and (7)). Two findings 
from the regressions are consistent with previous results in papers such as Chiswick 
(1978), Borjas (1985) and Duleep and Regets (1997). First, the wage returns to 
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education and experience are higher for native women than for immigrant women. 
For example, in Census 1980, one additional year of education increases the wage of 
natives by five to seven percent, but only increases the wage of immigrants by two to 
five percent. Second, immigrants who have been in the U.S. for a longer period of 
time have significantly higher wages than those who have just arrived, as indicated by 
the cohort dummy coefficients being larger for earlier cohorts than for more recent 
cohorts. This positive correlation between wages and length of stay in the U.S. is 
presumably a combination of assimilation effects and cohort effects. 
Regressions presented in Table 3.4 expand the wage equation in Borjas (1985) 
to include number of own children in the household and interactions between marital 
status and potential experience variables. Results show that there is a negative wage 
effect of number of children – one more child is associated with a two percent wage 
decline in for white female natives in 1970. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that women with more children tend to spend more time out of the labor 
force and therefore have a smaller incentive to invest in labor market human capital 
and also a shorter period of time to accumulate human capital. Coefficients on 
interactions between marital status and potential experience indicate that most 
married women have smaller returns to potential experience than single women 
(except for Asian natives in Census 1970 who have negative wage effects of potential 
experience among singles). This presumably reflects the fact that potential experience 
is a more upward biased measure of true experience for married women than for 
single women. Number of children and the interaction between marital status and 
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experience may change over time, so failing to control for them in the regressions 
would cause their changes to be captured as part of the unobserved quality change.41  
Unobserved dimensions of quality differences across female immigrant 
cohorts are calculated by applying estimated coefficients in Table 3.4 and the mean 
values of independent variables calculated from appendix Table A3.4 to the formula 
in equation (5). The results are reported in Tables 3.5a through 3.5c, which present 
the quality comparisons between Census 1970 and 1980, between Census 1980 and 
1990, and between Census 1990 and 2000 respectively. Most of the quality difference 
estimates are statistically significant. According to Table 3.5a, white immigrants who 
migrated during 1975-79 have a predicted wage after at most five years in this 
country that is 39 percent42 lower than those who migrated during 1965-69. For native 
whites, their predicted wage is 26 percent lower in 1980 than in 1970. Therefore, 
relative to natives, the predicted wage of cohort 1975-79 is lower than cohort 1965-69 
by 13 percentage points among white immigrants. For Asian and Mexican female 
immigrants, the unobserved quality of cohort 1975-79 is higher than that of cohort 
1965-69. The magnitudes of the relative quality improvement are 1.8 percentage 
points for Asian immigrants and 8.3 percentage points for Mexican immigrants. 
Cohorts migrating during 1960-64 and during 1950-59 are observed in Census 1970 
with six to 20 years of residence in the US. These cohorts’ predicted wages are 
measured after a relatively lengthy exposure to the US economy and thus capture the 
across-cohort differences in both entry wages and wage growth rates after arrival. For 
                                                 
41 Although not reported here, regressions results from Census 1990 and 2000 show similar patterns as discussed 
above. 
42 A decrease in predicted log wage by X is approximately equal to a decrease of predicted wage by X*100 percent. 
This is because: log(w1)-log(w2)=log(w1/w2)=log(w1/w2-1+1)=log((w1-w2)/w2+1), which is approximately 
equal to (w1-w2)/w2 when (w1-w2)/w2 is small. Numbers in Column 3 of Table 5 are calculated as Column 1 
(percentage) minus Column 2 (percentage) so they are in percentage points.  
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all immigrant groups, the predicted wages are higher for cohort 1970-74 than for 
cohort 1960-64, and lower for cohort 1960-69 than for cohort 1950-59.  
Figure 3.5 presents a comparison of estimated quality differences between 
female and male immigrants, based on results from Table 3.5a in this paper and those 
from Table 5 in Borjas (1985). For Asian and Mexican immigrants, there is a quality 
decline from cohort 1965-69 to cohort 1975-79 among male workers but a quality 
increase among female workers. For Black immigrants, both male and female 
workers experience decreased predicted wages from cohort 1965-69 to cohort 1975-
79 but the magnitude of the decline is smaller for female immigrants. White 
immigrants are the only group where female immigrants fared worse than male 
immigrants during this period. So overall, the unobserved dimensions of human 
capital increase more among female immigrants than among male immigrants from 
cohort 1965-69 to cohort 1975-79.  
Quality differences across cohorts in later years are presented in Tables 3.5b 
and 3.5c. From cohort 1975-79 to cohort 1985-89, white and black female immigrants 
exhibit quality increases across cohorts while Asian and Mexican female immigrants 
show quality declines. The underlying reasons for the quality decline are different 
between Asian and Mexican immigrants. Asian natives experience healthy wage 
increases from Census 1980 to 1990 but the wage differences between cohort 1975-
79 and 1985-89 among Asian immigrants do not catch up with their native 
counterparts, resulting in quality declines among Asian immigrants relative to natives. 
By contrast, the experiences of Mexicans different. Both Mexican immigrants and 
natives of Mexican origin had low wage growth between Census 1980 and 1990, 
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compared to other ethnic groups and compared to their own historical experience. 
One possible explanation is the increasing return to education over the 1980s. White 
natives, on average, have higher levels of education than natives of Mexican origin. 
When the return to education increases, white natives on average benefit more from 
the higher return to education than natives of Mexican origin, leading to larger 
average wage increases for White natives. Since Mexican immigrants have even 
lower educational attainment than natives of Mexican origin, their predicted wage 
growth is even lower, leading to an observed relative quality decline of Mexican 
immigrants from 1980 to 1990.  
Results from the most recent two decades are presented in Table 3.5c. 
Although the most recent cohorts of female immigrants have lower predicted wages 
than those who arrived ten years before, the magnitude of the quality decline is 
smaller than those in Tables 3.5a and 3.5b. This is similar to what has been found for 
male immigrants in Borjas and Friedberg (2006) and Bohn (2007).  
Some cohorts are observed across multiple years, which allows one to 
examine cohort quality at different positions along their duration in the U.S. For 
example, cohort 1965-69 in Census 1970 and cohort 1975-79 in Census 1980 can be 
compared in terms of wages at entry, and can also be compared in Census 1980 and 
Census 1990, 10 to 15 years after entry. For White immigrants, the predicted wage at 
entry is 13 percentage point lower for cohort 1975-79 than for cohort 1965-69. After 
ten more years of residence in the US, cohort 1975-79 has a wage 6.3 percentage 
point higher than cohort 1965-69, as shown in Table 3.5b. The faster assimilation rate 
of cohort 1975-79 than cohort 1965-69 has contributed to the takeover.  
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Analogous to Figure 3.4, which depicts raw log wages across cohorts, Figure 
3.6 portrays predicted log wages across cohorts. Since the same X means are used in 
the calculation of predicted wages for both immigrants and natives, the difference in 
predicted wages between immigrants and natives is a “residual” wage difference not 
explained by the Xs in the wage equation. For all four immigrant groups, predicted 
wages of immigrants lie below those of natives, indicating that newly arrived 
immigrants have wage disadvantages compared to natives with similar characteristics. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that skills brought by immigrants from 
home countries are not valued as much as skills hold by native workers in the U.S. 
labor market. The wage gap between immigrants and natives is especially large for 
Asian and Mexican immigrants. Similar to the trends in raw wages, predicted wages 
are lower for cohort 1975-79 than for cohort 1965-69 among all immigrants, and are 
higher for cohort 1995-99 than for cohort 1985-89 among all immigrants except 
Blacks.  
The one caveat to the above analysis is that it is based on a sample of working 
females only. Since human capital variables affect wages as well as selection into the 
labor force, failing to control for this self-selection into labor force would bias the 
estimate of wage returns to human capital. For example, the probability of being 
employed is positively associated with the level of education, so the wage effect of 
education would be underestimated if only working women are used in the wage 
regression. Without controlling for self-selection, a wage regression using working 
women only shows that the wage return of one additional year of education is 3.2 
percent for Asian immigrants in 1970 (Table 3.4a). After controlling for self-selection 
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using the Heckman two-step model and “number of children under age five” as an 
exclusion restriction, the wage effect of education increases to 5.8 percent for the 
same sample. If labor force selection patterns change over time, failing to control for 
this selection would affect the differences in predicted wages across cohorts. For 
example, an increasing fraction of working women would push up the coefficient of 
education and lead to a higher predicted wage for the more recent cohort.  
A possible approach to control for self-selection into labor force is to 
implement a Heckman two-step model. This model requires a valid exclusion 
restriction term which affects wages only through the labor market participation 
choice and has no direct impact on wages. However, such an exclusion restriction is 
virtually impossible to find.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examines the quality differences across successive cohorts 
among female immigrants along both observed and unobserved dimensions of human 
capital. Observed skills include English proficiency and educational attainment. 
English proficiency at entry does not change across successive cohorts of female 
immigrants. Educational attainment increases across cohorts and the increase is larger 
among female immigrants than among male immigrants. The patterns of these skill 
changes vary across racial and ethnic groups. The upward shift of high school 
dropouts due to a rising fraction of less educated Mexican immigrants is offset by the 
increase of college graduates among female immigrants, especially Asians.  
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Differences in predicted wages across cohorts reflect the differences in 
unobserved dimensions of human capital across cohorts. This “residual” wage is 
positive for many cohorts of female immigrants from 1970 to 1980, unlike the quality 
decline Borjas (1985) found for male immigrants in the same period. From 1980 to 
2000, the quality across successive cohorts of recent Asian and Mexican immigrants 
both declined, but the underlying reasons for the declines vary. Asian immigrants 
suffered quality declines across cohorts because they did not keep up with the large 
wage increases of Asian natives. On the other hand, Mexican immigrants and natives 
both show smaller wage increases than other ethnic groups, and Mexican immigrants 
fared even worse than native Mexicans. Mexicans, both native born and foreign, have 
lower educational attainment on average than people in other racial groups, which 
could lead to a relatively low wage increase when returns to education are rising.  
  65  
Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 
Specific human capital is an important component of human capital that 
affects worker productivity and returns in the labor market. Two examples of the role 
of specific human capital analyzed here are the earnings effects when workers 
experience involuntary job loss and the labor market consequences of migration.  
Workers who lose their jobs involuntarily experience an earnings shock partly 
because of a loss in specific human capital. In the case of immigrants, both general 
and specific human capital is depreciated when a worker migrates. This analysis of 
human capital of immigrants focuses on how the labor market values the human 
capital of successive cohorts of female immigrants to the United States. 
The existing literature on the earnings effects of job displacement 
demonstrates significant earnings losses post-displacement. The analysis here 
examines whether earnings costs differed across workers in high-tech versus low-tech 
industries. An extensive panel data set of individual workers’ earnings in the state of 
Maryland is used to estimate job displacement effects for the period 1989-2005. The 
analysis of earnings focuses on workers who lost their jobs but were subsequently 
reemployed, with any change in earnings interpreted as reflecting the effect of lost 
specific human capital. Workers in high-tech industries suffered larger initial earnings 
losses of approximately 14 percent one year after displacement, relative to the 
earnings losses of 10 percent for low-tech workers. Post displacement earnings 
recovery is faster for workers in high-tech industries than for workers in low-tech 
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industries, with disparities in earnings losses of high-tech versus low-tech workers 
disappearing in the long run.  
Much of the earnings loss of workers in high-tech industries is traceable to a 
subset of workers with earnings below the 75th percentile of their industry earnings 
distribution. Among workers with earnings above the 75th percentile, who are most 
likely managers, there is no statistically significant difference in earnings losses 
between hi-tech and low-tech displaced workers. In contrast, workers earnings below 
the 75th percentile experienced larger earnings losses in hi-tech industries than in low-
tech industries. For those workers between the 25th and 75th percentile of their 
industry earnings distribution, initial earnings losses are larger in hi-tech industries 
than low-tech industries, but earnings losses between the two groups converge over 
time as displaced workers in hi-tech industries experience faster wage growth. This 
suggests that the specific human capital these hi-tech workers lost upon displacement 
is recovered over time through returns to new specific human capital investments that 
are made in new jobs. In contrast, workers in the lowest quartile of the earnings 
distribution experience persistent earnings loss disparities between hi-tech and low-
tech industries even several years after job loss. For these low-earning workers, who 
are likely to do predominantly non-technology related jobs (even in hi-tech 
industries), those in hi-tech industries do not experience faster earnings recovery than 
those in low-tech industries. This is probably because what is lost with displacement 
for these workers is not specific human capital but rather a wage premium not 
correlated with labor market skills. 
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These findings reflect wage adjustments over the entire sample period from 
1989 to 2005 rather than just during the most recent years following the dot-com 
bubble burst.  The examination of earnings patterns for the two time periods pre- and 
post-2000 reveal that earnings losses were greater for high-tech workers in the pre-
2000 period than after. This is likely because of a downward adjustment in wages 
throughout the high-tech sector after 2000 (hence affecting the earnings of the non-
displaced workers who serve as a reference group to estimate displacement costs). 
Therefore, the results here reflect wage patterns beyond those of the dot-com bubble 
and collapse.   
The results appear robust to a number of plausible assumptions about the 
subsequent earnings experience of displaced workers who “disappear” from the state 
of Maryland data after their initial job losses. While some of these workers may have 
left the work force or were unemployed, a significant number were likely working in 
other states. Approximately one sixth of the “disappearing” workers in the Maryland 
file have joined the labor force in a number of states surrounding Maryland, 
appearing in a data file of earnings histories recently obtained from neighboring states 
covering the 2004-2006 time period.   
To test for the possible effects of attrition in the Maryland data, the analysis 
was repeated by including those workers employed in other states in the period since 
2004.  There is no difference in the percentages of high-tech and low-tech workers 
who reappeared working in nearby states. Adding these workers employed outside 
Maryland to the original data set of workers remaining in Maryland throughout the 
entire period yielded virtually identical statistical results.  
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Immigrants to the United States face the challenge of entering labor markets 
in a new country where both general human capital may not be highly valued and 
where some specific human capital may also be lost with relocation. Immigrants 
suffer a wage disadvantage on arrival compared to natives with similar skills. A great 
deal of empirical literature describes the decline in skills of male immigrants to the 
United States in successive cohorts from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the most 
pronounced declines caused by changes in county of origin from Europe toward 
Asian and Latin America. The analysis here refines and extends this analysis, 
focusing on changes in the human capital of female immigrants to the United States. 
Measuring changes in the human capital of female immigrants considers both 
observed characteristics such as English proficiency and education, as well as other 
unobserved factors that are reflected in market wages. The English proficiency of 
female immigrants has remained stable across successive cohorts from the 1970s to 
the 1990s. Educational attainment (years of school) has increased across successive 
cohorts, although there remains a gap between education of immigrants and natives.  
Much of the advance in the education of immigrants reflects increases in college 
degrees among white and Asian immigrants. While the education level of Mexican 
immigrants has risen significantly since 1960, it remains far below that of other 
immigrant groups or natives at present. Across all immigrant groups, the education 
gap between immigrants and natives among females has declined significantly, 
whereas the education gap for male immigrants relative to natives has increased 
sharply since 1980, much of it traceable to the disproportionate growth in Mexican 
immigrants who have lower education levels.   
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In the period 1970 to 2000, white and black female immigrants have higher 
raw wages than their native counterparts, whereas Asian and Mexican immigrants 
have lower wages than their native counterparts. After holding constant the human 
capital variables, predicted wages are lower for all groups of immigrants than for their 
native counterparts, indicating a wage disadvantage among newly arrived immigrants. 
Across all immigrant groups, both raw and predicted wages are lower among cohort 
1975-79 than among cohort 1965-69. From cohort 1975-79 to cohort 1995-99, raw 
wages become higher for white, black and Asian immigrants, and the rate of wage 
increase is similar to their native counterparts.  
Estimation of market wages for immigrants and natives follows the usual 
human capital approach, using age-6-education as a proxy for potential experience.  
Including marital status and the presence of children in the wage regressions provides 
a means of accounting for the effect on wages of time that child-bearing women 
spend out of the workforce. This non-labor-market experience is not reflected when 
using potential experience as a measure of real working experience. Unmeasured 
dimensions of human capital, such as innate ability, self-motivation, and types of 
experience also are reflected in market wages. Comparisons of predicted market 
wages of immigrants across successive cohorts of female immigrants provides a 
measure of changes in unobserved dimensions of human capital as reflected in market 
valuations.   
Changes in unmeasured dimensions vary by cohort and race/ethnicity. 
Measured within five years after arrival in the U.S., the predicted wages of cohort 
1975-79 are higher than those of cohort 1965-69 for Asian and Mexican female 
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immigrants. This result is in stark contrast to what Borjas (1985) found for male 
immigrants, who experienced substantial quality declines between the same two 
cohorts among Asian and Mexican immigrants. For white and black female 
immigrants, the quality declined between these two cohorts but the magnitude of 
decline is smaller for black female immigrants than for black male immigrants.   
Compared to cohort 1975-79, predicted wages of cohort 1985-89 are lower for 
Asian and Mexican female immigrants. The underlying reasons for this vary between 
these two groups. Asian immigrants suffer relative wages declines because they could 
not keep up with the high wage growth of Asian natives during this period; in contrast, 
both Mexican immigrants and natives experience wage declines from the late 1970s 
to the late 1980s, probably because of their low education levels and the increasing 
return to education. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the magnitude of predicted 
wage changes becomes smaller for all groups, indicating a trend towards fewer 
unobserved quality differences across the two most recent cohorts of immigrants. 
There are many possible avenues of future research that can be explored 
following this dissertation. As discussed in Chapter One, the incentive to invest in 
human capital, especially specific human capital, decreases with age. The tendency of 
younger workers to accumulate more new skills would affect the wage patterns for 
displaced workers after job loss and for immigrants after arriving in the U.S. The data 
set used in Chapter Two to study displaced workers does not contain information on 
age, but it would be interesting to exploit other data sets to investigate the differential 
earnings recoveries across age groups among hi-tech displaced workers. Similarly, it 
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would be interesting to conduct formally the analysis in Chapter Three disaggregating 
the results by age where sample sizes allow. 
The results in Chapter Two show that displaced workers in hi-tech industries 
began to experience lower earnings than other displaced workers even before 
displacement occurred. It would be interesting to examine the pre-displacement 
earnings histories in more detail. By taking advantage of this data set in which 
workers in the same firm can be identified, one could investigate whether workers 
remaining in firms with mass layoffs also suffer earnings decline before the layoffs 
occur. This could further distinguish whether the pre-displacement earnings drop of 
displaced workers is the result of the worsening firm conditions or of the human 
capital deterioration of workers who are ultimately displaced. 
Finally, with the rapid and tremendous changes in the U.S. economy, 
particularly the fast advances in technology and increases in immigrant flows, it will 
be important and interesting to reexamine the two issues studied here using future 
data. Further developments in high technology may lead to more specific skills 
associated with various jobs, while the expansion of cutting-edge technologies to 
more firms may ease transitions from job to job. Both of these two circumstances 
would affect the displacement costs for hi-tech workers. As the fraction of 
immigrants rises in the U.S. population, their wage disadvantage may shrink as a 
result of a more ethnically diversified labor market. On the other hand, increasing 
competition among immigrant workers may have a negative impact on wages of 
immigrants, as discussed in Bohn (2007). Future research will have to tease out the 
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impacts of all of these varying forces on the future fortunes of workers in the United 
States. 
  73  
Appendices 
 
Appendix 2A Worker Composition 
The sample used in this paper follows a fixed cohort of workers who were 
working in 1992:1. Therefore, workers who entered the labor market in Maryland 
after 1992:1 are missed. However, the composition of workers did not change much 
between 1990 and 2000. Table A2.1a presents the educational and demographic 
composition of Maryland workers in four typical hi-tech industries and in all other 
industries in 1990 and 2000, as calculated using data from the 1990 and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata from the U.S. Census. Educated workers and Asian workers increased 
by a larger extent in hi-tech industries than in other industries between 1990 and 2000. 
But overall, the changes in worker composition did not differ much between hi-tech 
industries and other industries. Table A2.1b shows that the whole nation’s worker 
composition and its change over time do not differ much from Maryland, except that 
Maryland has more educated workers and more non-White workers.  
 
Appendix 2B Technology Measures 
The first technology indicator is the fraction of workers using computer at 
work, calculated from the CPS 1997 Computer Ownership/Internet Supplement, and 
the CPS 2001 and 2003 Internet and Computer Use Supplement. When linking this 
indicator to individuals, the 1997 value for the 1989-1998 period, the 2001 value for 
the 1999-2002 period, and the 2003 value for the 2003-2005 period are used.43 Links 
                                                 
43 Using the computer usage average from 1997, 2001 and 2003 generates similar results.  
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of the first two periods are based on the industries’ SIC codes, and links of the last 
period are based on NAICS codes.  
The second indicator is the fraction of new investment in hi-tech equipment, 
calculated from the BEA’s capital flow table of 1992 and 1997. The 1992 value for 
the 1989-1996 period based on SIC codes is used, as well as the 1997 value for the 
1997-2005 period based on NAICS codes. 
The third measure is company and other (except Federal) industrial R&D 
funds as a percent of net sales, obtained from the National Science Foundation (NSF). 
Values are available from 1988 to 2001 for manufacturing industries and from 1995 
to 2001 for non-manufacturing industries. Missing values are replaced by those 
available in adjacent years. For example, values of manufacturing industries in 1994 
are equal to their corresponding values in 1995. Then values in each year are linked to 
individuals, using SIC codes for 1989-1998 and NAICS for 1999-2005. 
The fourth indicator is the fraction of scientists and engineers in the workforce 
in each industry, calculated from the CPS 1994, 1998 and 2002. The 1994 value is 
used for the 1989-1995 period, the 1998 value is used for the 1996-2000 period, and 
the 2002 value is used for the 2001-2005 period, all based on SIC codes.  
In the MD UI data, industry codes are reported by SIC 1987 system during 
1989-2000 and by NAICS 2002 system during 2001-2005. In order to match to the 
industry level technology indicators, sometimes it is necessary to convert between 
SIC and NAICS codes using the correspondence table at the Census Bureau.   
 
Appendix 2C Impute Earnings for Disappearers 
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Earnings are imputed for disappearers to obtain an upper bound of earnings 
losses differentials between hi-tech and low-tech workers. The imputation is 
conducted for both permanent disappearers and temporary disappearers. For hi-tech 
permanent disappearers, earnings in the first four quarters after a worker disappears 
are equal to this worker’s average quarterly earnings in the six years44 before he/she 
drops out from the data. For example, if a worker disappears from the data in the 
second quarter of a certain year, then the earnings in the third quarter of this year is 
set to be the average third quarter earnings from his earnings history during the six 
years before he/she drops out from the data. Earnings in the fifth quarter and forward 
following his disappearance are determined using earnings in the first four quarters 
following his disappearance and the annual earnings growth rate calculated from his 
earnings history. Projecting earnings in this way takes into account the seasonal 
effects and the person specific earnings growth rate. For hi-tech temporary 
disappearers, the consecutive missing earnings are replaced by the first non-missing 
earnings that come after the missing earnings quarters for hi-tech displaced workers. 
For low-tech disappearers, missing earnings in quarters after the worker drops out 
from the data are replaced by zeros. Missing technology values associated with these 
missing earnings are replaced by non-missing technology values in the preceding 
quarters.  
                                                 
44 This long time period is used because earnings in years immediately before displacement are very low relative 
to workers’ normal earnings prior to displacement (the "Ashenfelter dip"). To implement this calculation, workers 
who disappear from the data in the first six years of the sample period are dropped.   
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Appendix 3A: Definition of variables in the regressions 
Dependent variable:  
lwage=log(annual earnings/weeks worked last year/hours worked per week) 
Mid-points are taken when hours/weeks are reported as intervals in Census 
1970: 
weeks=8.1  if wkswork2=1-13  
weeks=20.8 if wkswork2=14-26  
weeks=33.1 if wkswork2=27-39  
weeks=42.4 if wkswork2=40-47  
weeks=48.3 if wkswork2=48-49  
weeks=51.8 if wkswork2=50-52  
hours=8.8  if hrswork2=1-14  
hours=20.9 if hrswork2=15-29 
hours=31.2 if hrswork2=30-34 
hours=36.5 if hrswork2=35-39 
hours=40   if hrswork2=40 
hours=45.2 if hrswork2=41-48 
hours=51.9 if hrswork2=49-59 
hours=67.5 if hrswork2=60+ 
Independent variables: 
Educ=years of education 
(1st to 4th grade = 2.5 years;  
5th to 8th grade = 6.5 years;  
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1 to 3 years of college = 14 years;  
4+ years of college = 18.1 years.  
According to 1990 Census (Census 1970 and 1980 do not have information on 
type of degrees), among immigrants with 4+ years of college, 59% are bachelor, 24% 
are master, 10% are professional, and 7% are Ph.D. So the weighted average years of 
education corresponding to “4+ years of college” is calculated as: 
59%*16+24%*18+10%*18+7%*22=18.1) 
Exper=Age-6-Educ 
Mar=1 if married and spouse present; =0 otherwise 
Hlth=1 if disability affects work; =0 if no disability that affects work 
Smsa=1 if in metro area; =0 otherwise 
Nchild= number of own children in the household 
Nchilt5=number of own children under age 5 in the household 
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Appendix 3B: Replication of Borjas (1985) 
Using Borjas’s framework introduced in section 3.3.1, I obtain very similar 
results as in his work. The data are drawn from the 1970 and 1980 census and the 
sample is restricted to men ages 18-54 in 1970 and 28-64 in 1980. The sample 
selection criteria are similar to those for female immigrants except the age range. 
Based on equations (1), (2), (6) and (7), I run the cross-section regressions for 
native people and immigrants, for t=1970 and t=1980, respectively. For some large 
groups (e.g., white natives in both 1970 and 1980, black and Mexican natives in 1980, 
etc.), random samples are drawn from the census data. Because of this randomness 
and the fact that there are some unknown sample selection criteria in Borjas’ work, 
my sample cannot be exactly the same as his. Therefore my estimated coefficients are 
slightly different from his. The results of the regressions are presented in Table A3.1. 
The mean values of the socioeconomic characteristics for each cohort are used 
in the process of decomposing cross-section growth into within-cohort and across-
cohort components. Table A3.2 presents these mean values kX  as of 1980. Again, 
because of the difference in sample selection, the mean values are slightly different 
from those in Borjas’ work. 
Based on the numbers in Table A3.1 and A3.2 and the following regression 
equations, I can obtain the predicted log wage of a worker who is statistically similar 
to the average immigrant from cohort k: 
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where y is log (wage rate/10) and X includes education, experience (age-6-education 
years), experience squared, marital status, health, residence in SMSA. 
 
The cross-section growth is decomposed into two parts:  
Cross-section growth = (within-cohort growth) + (across-cohort-growth).  
 
Based on the above predicted values, the decomposition can be obtained by: 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ( ,8010,80,80,80 nknk yyyy −−− + = [ )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( ,70,70,80,80 nknk yyyy −−− ] +  
[ )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( ,8010,80,70,70 nknk yyyy −−− + ] 
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Table 2.1 Industry Distribution of Maryland and the U.S. 
 
Industry MD US 
   
Goods Producing-Agricultural Services 0.2% 0.8% 
Goods producing-Other Agricultural 0.1% 1.7% 
Mining 0.0% 0.6% 
Construction 3.5% 6.4% 
Mfg-Lumber & Wood Prods, Ex Furniture 0.1% 0.6% 
Mfg-Furniture & Fixtures 0.2% 0.5% 
Mfg-Stone, Clay, Concrete, Glass Prods 0.5% 0.5% 
Mfg-Primary Metals 0.8% 0.6% 
Mfg-Fabricated Metals 0.5% 1.0% 
Mfg-Machinery, Ex Electrical 0.9% 1.9% 
Mfg-Electrical Machinery,equip Supplies 0.8% 1.7% 
Mfg-Motor Vehicles & Equip 1.0% 2.0% 
Mfg-Professional & Photo Equip, Watches 1.6% 0.6% 
Mfg-Misc & Nec Mfg Industries 0.1% 0.4% 
Mfg-Food & Kindred Prods 1.7% 1.6% 
Mfg-Tobacco Prods 0.0% 0.0% 
Mfg-Textile Mill Prods 0.1% 0.5% 
Mfg-Apparel & Other Finished Textile Pr 0.5% 1.0% 
Mfg-Paper & Allied Products 0.7% 0.6% 
Mfg-Printing, Publishing & Allied Inds 1.5% 1.6% 
Mfg-Chemicals & Allied Prods 1.0% 1.1% 
Mfg-Petroleum & Coal Prods 0.0% 0.1% 
Mfg-Rubber & Misc Plastic Prods 0.6% 0.6% 
Mfg-Leather & Leather Prods 0.1% 0.1% 
Transportation 2.6% 4.2% 
Communications 2.3% 1.4% 
Utilities & Sanitary Services 1.5% 1.3% 
Wholesale Trade 3.8% 3.9% 
Retail Trade 18.6% 20.1% 
Banking And Other Finance 3.4% 3.7% 
Insurance And Real Estate 3.4% 1.0% 
Private Household Services 0.0% 4.2% 
Business Services 7.1% 1.5% 
Automobile And Repair Services 0.3% 2.9% 
Personal Serv Exc Private Households 0.0% 1.7% 
Entertainment & Recreation Services 2.8% 3.9% 
Health Services 9.2% 12.2% 
Educational Services 12.5% 2.3% 
Social Services 2.0% 4.6% 
Other Professional Services 4.4% 0.1% 
Forestry & Fisheries 0.0% 1.6% 
Justice, Public Order & Safety 1.5% 0.6% 
Admin Of Human Resource Programs 1.2% 0.6% 
National Security & Internal Affairs 0.0% 1.6% 
Other Public Administration 5.3% 0.1% 
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Data source: numbers of MD are calculated from MD UI data 1992:1; numbers of US 
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Table 2.2 Average Quarterly Earnings and Number of Observations:  
“Disappearers” vs. “Non-disappearers” 
 
 Displaced Workers Non-Displaced Workers 
 Earnings N Earnings N 
All workers     
     
Permanently Disappearers $6,819 4459(37%) $8,119 5488(44%) 
Temporarily Disappearers $6,413 2871(24%) $7,349 2013(16%) 
Stayers $7,128 4588(39%) $9,107 4918 (40%) 
     
Total $6,840 11918 $8,386 12419 
     
Hi-tech workers     
     
Permanently Disappearers $7,758 1937(38%) $8,838 3784(43%) 
Temporarily Disappearers $7,248 1149(22%) $8,282 1397(16%) 
Stayers $7,949 2033(40%) $9,753 3636(41%) 
     
Total $7,720 5119 $9,127 8817 
     
Low-tech workers     
     
Permanently Disappearers $5,978 2321(37%) $6,510 1695(47%) 
Temporarily Disappearers $5,836 1610(26%) $5,233 616(17%) 
Stayers $6,226 2338(37%) $7,272 1281(36%) 
     
Total $6,034 6269 $6,563 3592 
 
Note: Average quarterly earnings are calculated using only non-missing earnings, for the 
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Table 2.3 Average Quarterly Earnings before and after Displacement, 
by Current Working States 
 
 Current working states N 
Ave qrt earnings 
2004:3-2005:3 
(1) 






Low-tech MD 3463 7111 6105 1006 
 neighbor states 524 8316 6116 2200 
      
Hi-tech MD 4283 8265 6932 1333 
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Table A2.1a Worker Composition in 1990 and 2000, MD 
 





 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Education           
less than HS 6.4% 3.2% 3.2% 1.7% 3.1% 1.3% 5.7% 3.9% 13.2% 9.8%
HS graduate 28.0% 19.0% 31.9% 24.1% 29.4% 22.4% 21.8% 15.1% 32.8% 29.2%
some college 27.4% 28.5% 41.0% 41.3% 35.0% 36.8% 25.7% 23.5% 26.9% 28.7%
above college 38.2% 49.3% 23.8% 32.9% 32.5% 39.6% 46.8% 57.6% 27.1% 32.3%
           
Age           
25-34 38.8% 19.2% 35.6% 32.9% 41.8% 30.1% 34.1% 40.6% 35.7% 26.4%
35-44 28.9% 37.7% 34.7% 32.2% 31.6% 33.6% 34.0% 34.6% 31.5% 33.3%
45-54 21.9% 28.7% 20.4% 29.9% 17.8% 25.9% 19.2% 18.4% 21.3% 27.0%
55-64 10.4% 14.4% 9.3% 5.1% 8.8% 10.4% 12.7% 6.4% 11.5% 13.4%
           
Race           
white 81.9% 76.8% 73.2% 63.7% 78.9% 75.1% 78.5% 71.1% 77.1% 73.4%
black 14.4% 14.0% 25.8% 32.4% 18.4% 21.1% 18.8% 19.3% 20.0% 22.3%
asian 3.6% 9.2% 0.9% 3.6% 2.4% 3.6% 2.8% 8.4% 2.7% 4.0%
 
Sources: 1990, 2000 Census, MD weighted population. 
 
Table A2.1b Worker Composition in 1990 and 2000,US 
 





 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Education           
less than HS 12.6% 9.5% 5.1% 2.9% 3.4% 2.4% 8.1% 4.1% 42.9% 39.6%
HS graduate 32.8% 28.9% 35.3% 24.1% 30.4% 23.2% 26.9% 17.2% 25.2% 24.3%
some college 29.8% 31.0% 38.2% 40.9% 36.3% 37.3% 25.1% 24.6% 18.6% 20.4%
above college 24.8% 30.6% 21.4% 32.2% 30.0% 37.0% 40.0% 54.1% 13.3% 15.8%
           
Age           
25-34 36.3% 25.9% 33.4% 32.4% 40.1% 31.2% 31.5% 28.5% 33.6% 26.3%
35-44 29.6% 34.4% 35.1% 30.0% 29.6% 32.6% 33.6% 36.1% 29.4% 31.0%
45-54 20.3% 27.0% 19.5% 27.8% 18.6% 23.9% 19.4% 24.0% 20.0% 25.8%
55-64 13.8% 12.8% 12.1% 9.7% 11.8% 12.3% 15.5% 11.4% 17.0% 17.0%
           
Race           
white 85.7% 78.7% 85.0% 79.9% 87.3% 84.8% 86.7% 80.8% 84.3% 81.9%
black 7.6% 8.3% 12.3% 15.3% 9.1% 10.2% 10.1% 9.9% 12.1% 13.2%
asian 6.3% 12.3% 2.2% 4.4% 3.2% 4.7% 3.1% 9.2% 2.9% 4.0%
 
Sources: 1990, 2000 Census, U.S. weighted population. 
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Table A2.2 Technology Measures by Industry 
 
Table A2.2a Fraction of Workers Using Computers at Work, by Industry 
 
 1997 2001 
 % % 
Goods Producing-Agricultural Services 20.1 30.6 
Goods producing-Other Agricultural 11.3 19.5 
Mining 42.9 42.4 
Construction 18.8 24.0 
Mfg-Lumber & Wood Prods, Ex Furniture 16.9 24.9 
Mfg-Furniture & Fixtures 28.3 32.0 
Mfg-Stone, Clay, Concrete, Glass Prods 31.6 37.0 
Mfg-Primary Metals 42.9 45.0 
Mfg-Fabricated Metals 36.4 44.6 
Mfg-Machinery, Ex Electrical 54.1 53.9 
Mfg-Electrical Machinery,equip Supplies 58.7 56.9 
Mfg-Motor Vehicles & Equip 42.5 39.9 
Mfg-Aircraft & Parts 71.2 65.0 
Mfg-Other Transportation Equipment 55.5 55.6 
Mfg-Professional & Photo Equip, Watches 63.4 68.7 
Mfg-Toys,amusement & Sporting Goods 46.3 44.3 
Mfg-Misc & Nec Mfg Industries 35.0 40.4 
Mfg-Food & Kindred Prods 25.9 31.2 
Mfg-Tobacco Prods 67.1 27.8 
Mfg-Textile Mill Prods 30.7 27.7 
Mfg-Apparel & Other Finished Textile Pr 16.2 24.7 
Mfg-Paper & Allied Products 45.0 46.3 
Mfg-Printing, Publishing & Allied Inds 58.6 59.5 
Mfg-Chemicals & Allied Prods 65.4 68.2 
Mfg-Petroleum & Coal Prods 67.4 81.1 
Mfg-Rubber & Misc Plastic Prods 38.7 45.3 
Mfg-Leather & Leather Prods 23.6 46.9 
Transportation 38.2 38.7 
Communications 79.4 77.1 
Utilities & Sanitary Services 57.5 59.6 
Wholesale Trade 51.8 55.3 
Eating And Drinking Places 15.6 21.2 
Other Retail Trade 40.2 42.0 
Banking And Other Finance 85.2 83.1 
Insurance And Real Estate 71.6 73.7 
Private Household Services 3.1 8.6 
Business Services 57.3 59.5 
Automobile And Repair Services 28.5 35.3 
Personal Serv Exc Private Households 26.5 33.0 
Entertainment & Recreation Services 33.0 40.5 
Hospitals 66.9 70.5 
Health Services, Exc. Hospitals 44.8 52.4 
Educational Services 60.7 67.8 
Social Services 32.1 41.9 
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Other Professional Services 73.9 77.6 
Forestry & Fisheries 29.6 40.5 
Justice, Public Order & Safety 65.2 66.6 
Admin Of Human Resource Programs 76.5 79.5 
National Security & Internal Affairs 81.7 76.3 
Other Public Administration 75.6 74.0 
   
mean 45.3 48.2  
25% quartile 29.1 34.2  
median 42.9 45.0  
75% quartile 64.3 65.8  
Source: CPS 1997, 2001. 
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Crop production                                                                  2.43 
Animal production                                                                2.74 
Forestry and logging                                                             4.10 
Fishing, hunting and trapping                                                    16.87 
Agriculture and forestry support activities                                      8.75 
Oil and gas extraction 24.86 
Coal mining                                                                      3.99 
Metal ores mining                                                                13.53 
Nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying                                         15.06 
Support activities for mining                                                    17.20 
Power generation and supply                                                      18.80 
Natural gas distribution                                                         38.35 
Water, sewage and other systems                                                  12.54 
New and maintenance and repair construction 13.44 
Food manufacturing                                                               19.01 
Beverage manufacturing                                                           17.60 
Tobacco manufacturing                                                            43.68 
Textile mills                                                                    9.86 
Textile product mills                                                            22.11 
Apparel manufacturing                                                            20.55 
Leather and allied product manufacturing                                         20.00 
Wood product manufacturing                                                       13.11 
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills                                                13.74 
Converted paper product manufacturing                                            20.09 
Printing and related support activities                                          25.73 
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing                                        22.31 
Basic chemical manufacturing                                                     33.42 
Resin, rubber, and artificial fibers manufacturing                                34.75 
Agricultural chemical manufacturing                                              29.98 
Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing                                        46.71 
Paint, coating, and adhesive manufacturing                                       37.07 
Soap, cleaning compound, and toiletry manufacturing                              34.12 
Other chemical product and preparation manufacturing                             33.87 
Plastics and rubber products manufacturing                                       8.64 
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing                                        17.76 
Iron and steel mills and manufacturing from purchased steel                      14.58 
Nonferrous metal production and processing                                       23.25 
Foundries                                                                       18.82 
Forging and stamping                                                             17.33 
Cutlery and handtool manufacturing                                                           17.53 
Architectural and structural metals manufacturing                                25.40 
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Boiler, tank, and shipping container manufacturing                               20.22 
Ordnance and accessories manufacturing                                                         33.33 
Other fabricated metal product manufacturing                                                  21.05 
Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery                                  25.20 
Industrial machinery manufacturing                                               28.23 
Commercial and service industry machinery                                        38.18 
HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment                                      25.93 
Metalworking machinery manufacturing                                             39.27 
Turbine and power transmission equipment manufacturing                           25.29 
Other general purpose machinery manufacturing                                    30.54 
Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing                                            66.02 
Audio, video, and communications equipment manufacturing                            50.38 
Semiconductor and electronic component manufacturing                                    20.00 
Electronic instrument manufacturing 56.13 
Magnetic media manufacturing and reproducing 52.48 
Electric lighting equipment manufacturing                                                    22.87 
Household appliance manufacturing                                                             21.84 
Electrical equipment manufacturing                                                           30.49 
Other electrical equipment and component manufacturing                                  23.16 
Motor vehicle manufacturing                                                      21.36 
Motor vehicle body, trailer, and parts manufacturing                                          23.64 
Aerospace product and parts manufacturing                                        48.78 
Other transportation equipment manufacturing                                     28.41 
Furniture and related product manufacturing                                      17.48 
Medical equipment and supplies manufacturing                                                  38.03 
Other miscellaneous manufacturing                                                      24.02 
Wholesale trade 35.31 
Retail trade 31.43 
Air transportation                                                               44.44 
Rail transportation                                                              12.53 
Water transportation                                                             52.17 
Truck transportation                                                             12.87 
Transit and ground passenger transportation                                      21.38 
Pipeline transportation                                                          71.44 
Scenic and sightseeing transportation and support activities for transportation   36.84 
Couriers and messengers                                                          27.02 
Warehousing and storage                                                          29.40 
Newspaper, book, and directory publishers                                        47.79 
Software publishers                                                              89.16 
Motion picture and sound recording industries                                    53.95 
Radio and television broadcasting                                                81.51 
Cable networks and program distribution                                          91.07 
Telecommunications                                                               82.59 
Information services                                                             69.81 
Data processing services                                                         87.82 
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Monetary authorities, credit intermediation and related activities               72.96 
Securities, commodity contracts, investments                                     77.77 
Insurance carriers and related activities                                        65.32 
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles                                      88.83 
Real estate (and owner occupied dwellings)                                                        20.47 
Automotive equipment rental and leasing                                          2.70 
Consumer goods and general rental centers                                        23.96 
Machinery and equipment rental and leasing                                       35.79 
Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets                                       86.26 
Legal services                                                                   71.48 
Accounting and bookkeeping services                                              77.05 
Architectural and engineering services                                           78.28 
Specialized design services                                                      33.11 
Computer systems design and related services                                     90.66 
Management and technical consulting services                                     70.73 
Scientific research and development services                                     68.61 
Advertising and related services                                                 59.76 
Other professional and technical services                                        56.92 
Management of companies and enterprises                                          73.68 
Employment services                                                              66.35 
Travel arrangement and reservation services                                      74.41 
All other administrative and support services                                    42.90 
Waste management and remediation services                                        24.67 
Educational services                                                             46.19 
Ambulatory health care services                                                  32.45 
Hospitals                                                                        22.05 
Nursing and residential care facilities                                          24.50 
Social assistance                                                                44.66 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, zoos, and parks    45.55 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation                                              14.49 
Accommodation                                                                    16.16 
Food services and drinking places                                                8.86 
Automotive repair and maintenance                                                8.47 
Electronic, commercial, and household goods repair                               24.34 
Personal and laundry services                                                    39.14 
Religious, grantmaking and giving, and social advocacy organizations              40.12 
Civic, social, professional and similar organizations                                           56.64 
  
mean 36.0 
25% percentile 19.5 
median 28.4 
75% percentile 48.3 
Source: BEA capital flow tables 1997. 
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Table A2.2c R&D Funds as a Percent of Net Sales in R&D, by Industry 
 
Industry  1995 1996 1997 1998 
 % % % % 
Manufacturing  2.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 
  Food, kindred, and tobacco products 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
  Textiles and apparel 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 
  Lumber, wood products, and furniture 0.7 1.4 0.9 0.8 
  Paper and allied products 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 
 Chemicals and allied products 4.7 5.3 5.3 6.4 
         Industrial chemicals 3.9 3.7 3.5 5.1 
         Drugs and medicines 10.4 10.1 10.5 10.6 
         Other chemicals 1.4 2.7 2.1 2.5 
  Petroleum refining and extraction 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 
  Rubber products 1.6 1.8 1.4 2.1 
  Stone, clay, and glass products 1.5 1.2 1.8 1.4 
  Primary metals 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
       Ferrous metals and products 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 
       Nonferrous metals and products 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.8 
  Fabricated metal products 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.4 
  Machinery 3.6 5.1 5.6 5.1 
      Office, computing, and accounting 
machines 8.1 9.9 9.2 9.2 
      Other machinery, except electrical 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.1 
  Electrical equipment 5.4 6.1 5.7 6.6 
      Radio and TV receiving equipment 1.6 2.0 2.6 2.9 
      Communication equipment 8.0 8.5 8.0 11.2 
      Electronic components 8.0 8.5 8.1 8.4 
      Other electrical equipment 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 
  Transportation equipment 3.6 4.1 3.8 2.5 
      Motor vehicles and motor vehicles 
equipment 3.6 4.2 3.8 2.2 
      Other transportation equipment 0.9 1.2 2.2 2.3 
      Aircraft and missiles 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.3 
  Professional and scientific instruments 7.3 7.7 7.7 8.0 
      Scientific and mechanical measuring 
instruments 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.5 
      Optical, surgical, photographic, and other 
instruments 8.0 8.6 8.9 9.2 
  Other manufacturing industries 1.2 2.5 2.0 2.0 
Nonmanufacturing 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.9 
  Transportation and Utilities 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.5 
      Communications 2.2 1.9 0.7 0.9 
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          Telephone communications 2.1 1.9 0.7 0.9 
          Other communications 3.0 1.3 0.7 1.0 
      Electric, gas, and sanitary services 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
      Other transportation and utilities 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 
  Trade 2.4 2.3 2.4 3.6 
  Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 
  Services 5.9 6.8 8.6 9.2 
      Business services 9.5 9.9 10.8 10.3 
          Computer and data processing services 11.1 12.4 13.3 12.4 
          Other business services 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 
      Health services 5.2 5.9 5.2 8.4 
          Offices and clinics of medical doctors, 
hospitals,     
          medical and dental labs 5.3 6.1 … 8.7 
          Other health services 2.4 3.4 … 5.9 
      Engineering and management services 4.1 6.1 10.8 13.4 
          Engineering, architectural, and surveying 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.7 
          Research, development, and testing 7.2 9.7 38.5 50.8 
          Other engineering and management 
services 1.7 1.3 2.8 3.4 
      Other services 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 
  Other nonmanufacturing industries  0.8 2.5 2.9 6.8 
     
mean 3.18 3.51 4.46 5.12 
25% percentile 0.85 1.05 0.90 0.95 
median 2.00 2.00 2.60 2.70 
75% percentile 4.75 5.30 6.95 7.40 
Source: NSF R&D Table 1995-1998. 
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Table A2.2d Fraction of Scientists and Engineers, by Industry 
 
 1994 1998 2002 
 % % % 
Goods Producing-Agricultural Services 0.6  1.0  1.0  
Goods producing-Other Agricultural 0.1  0.1  0.1  
Mining 10.0  9.4  8.3  
Construction 1.4  1.3  1.2  
Mfg-Lumber & Wood Prods, Ex Furniture 1.2  0.8  0.9  
Mfg-Furniture & Fixtures 1.4  1.9  1.5  
Mfg-Stone, Clay, Concrete, Glass Prods 2.8  2.7  1.8  
Mfg-Primary Metals 5.3  4.6  5.0  
Mfg-Fabricated Metals 3.1  4.0  2.7  
Mfg-Not Specified Metal Industries 0.0  0.0  0.0  
Mfg-Machinery, Ex Electrical 9.9  9.7  10.6  
Mfg-Electrical Machinery,equip Supplies 13.1  16.1  16.2  
Mfg-Motor Vehicles & Equip 6.3  7.2  7.4  
Mfg-Aircraft & Parts 20.5  18.4  20.7  
Mfg-Other Transportation Equipment 20.7  20.4  17.4  
Mfg-Professional & Photo Equip, Watches 12.5  14.2  14.6  
Mfg-Toys,amusement & Sporting Goods 0.7  3.9  1.1  
Mfg-Misc & Nec Mfg Industries 1.5  1.6  2.8  
Mfg-Food & Kindred Prods 1.9  1.8  2.1  
Mfg-Tobacco Prods 2.3  6.1  7.7  
Mfg-Textile Mill Prods 0.7  1.5  1.6  
Mfg-Apparel & Other Finished Textile Pr 0.6  0.7  0.8  
Mfg-Paper & Allied Products 4.5  3.1  4.0  
Mfg-Printing, Publishing & Allied Inds 0.8  1.5  1.7  
Mfg-Chemicals & Allied Prods 11.6  11.7  13.6  
Mfg-Petroleum & Coal Prods 12.0  11.9  13.1  
Mfg-Rubber & Misc Plastic Prods 4.1  3.1  4.2  
Mfg-Leather & Leather Prods 1.9  1.6  0.6  
Transportation 1.0  0.9  1.1  
Communications 7.4  7.9  9.2  
Utilities & sanitary services 8.8  8.7  7.4  
Wholesale trade 1.2  1.4  1.7  
Eating and drinking places 0.0  0.0  0.0  
Other retail trade 0.3  0.3  0.5  
Banking and other finance 2.1  2.4  3.3  
Insurance and real estate 1.8  2.0  1.9  
Private household services 0.0  0.0  0.0  
Business services 6.8  10.4  11.8  
Automobile and repair services 0.3  0.3  0.3  
Personal serv exc private households 0.1  0.3  0.4  
Entertainment & recreation services 0.5  0.5  0.9  
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Hospitals 1.1  1.7  1.4  
Health services, exc. hospitals 0.5  0.5  0.9  
Educational services 1.4  1.4  1.5  
Social services 0.3  0.2  0.3  
Other professional services 9.7  10.3  10.5  
Forestry & fisheries 11.0  8.8  10.7  
Justice, public order & safety 0.6  0.5  0.6  
Admin of human resource programs 3.1  3.8  4.2  
National security & internal affairs 14.4  15.9  12.7  
Other public administration 9.1  9.9  10.4  
Armed Forces 0.0  0.0  0.0  
    
mean 4.6  4.9  5.0  
25% percentile 0.7  0.8  0.9  
median 1.9  2.0  1.9  
75% percentile 8.1 8.7 8.7 
Source: CPS 1994, 1998, 2002. 
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Table 3.1 English Proficiency of Female Immigrants with Zero to Five Years of 
Residence in the U.S. 
 
 1980 1990  2000 
 N Mean Std.  Dev. N Mean
Std.  
Dev. N Mean 
Std.  
Dev. 
        
Fraction of immigrants speaking English at least very well 
All 16029 0.365 (0.481) 21545 0.379 (0.485) 33121 0.389 (0.488)
          
White 3151 0.599 (0.490) 3449 0.632 (0.482) 6038 0.594 (0.491)
Black 1096 0.818 (0.385) 1273 0.793 (0.405) 2114 0.740 (0.439)
Asian 5876 0.321 (0.467) 7122 0.355 (0.478) 8980 0.415 (0.493)
Mexican 3017 0.124 (0.329) 4891 0.171 (0.376) 9679 0.185 (0.389)
          
Fraction of immigrants not speaking English at all 
          
All 16029 0.174 (0.380) 21545 0.175 (0.380) 33121 0.173 (0.378)
          
White 3151 0.085 (0.278) 3449 0.060 (0.238) 6038 0.064 (0.245)
Black 1096 0.016 (0.124) 1273 0.019 (0.136) 2114 0.022 (0.148)
Asian 5876 0.109 (0.312) 7122 0.101 (0.302) 8980 0.088 (0.283)
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Table 3.2 Educational Attainment of Female Immigrants with Zero to Five Years of 
Residence in the U.S. and of Female Natives, Age>24 
 
 1980 1990 2000 
 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
        
Fraction of high school dropouts 
Immigrants:          
All 8316 0.45 (0.50) 11971 0.34 (0.47) 19058 0.28 (0.45) 
White 1881 0.31 (0.46) 2121 0.15 (0.36) 3841 0.10 (0.30) 
Black 477 0.41 (0.49) 663 0.24 (0.43) 1144 0.19 (0.39) 
Asian 3351 0.35 (0.48) 4542 0.26 (0.44) 5947 0.15 (0.36) 
Mexican 1095 0.84 (0.37) 1980 0.69 (0.46) 4475 0.62 (0.49) 
          
Natives: 643675 0.33 (0.47) 766662 0.20 (0.40) 775559 0.13 (0.34) 
          
Fraction of college graduates 
Immigrants:          
All 8316 0.18 (0.39) 11971 0.23 (0.42) 19058 0.30 (0.46) 
White 1881 0.24 (0.43) 2121 0.32 (0.47) 3841 0.41 (0.49) 
Black 477 0.09 (0.29) 663 0.12 (0.33) 1144 0.20 (0.40) 
Asian 3351 0.26 (0.44) 4542 0.35 (0.48) 5947 0.48 (0.50) 
Mexican 1095 0.02 (0.16) 1980 0.05 (0.22) 4475 0.06 (0.23) 
          
















Average years of education 
Immigrants:          
All 8316 10.61 (5.27) 11971 11.42 (5.45) 19058 12.43 (5.03) 
White 1881 12.12 (4.75) 2121 13.62 (4.03) 3841 14.36 (3.87) 
Black 477 10.99 (3.94) 663 11.91 (3.93) 1144 12.63 (4.08) 
Asian 3351 11.68 (5.36) 4542 12.54 (5.62) 5947 14.34 (4.51) 
Mexican 1095 6.19 (4.26) 1980 7.49 (5.07) 4475 8.64 (4.66) 
          





 12.50   13.41   14.01  
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Table 3.3 Fraction of Individuals Excluded from Regressions due to Sample Selection 
Criteria 
 
 Immigrants Natives 
 % % 
Age<18 or age>64 29.5 41.7 
Self-employed 4.02 2.91 
Working but missing hour or week information 22.8 43.6 
Not working 46.5 33.8 
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Table 3.4 Coefficients of Wage Regressions, Female Immigrants and Natives, 
Y=log(wagerate) 
 
Table 3.4a Coefficients of Wage Regressions, Female Immigrants and Natives, Census 
1970. Y=log(wagerate) 
 
 White Black Asian Mexican 
 Natives 
Education 0.0721 0.0816 0.0646 0.0482 
 (0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0011)** (0.0007)** 
Experience 0.0188 0.0066 -0.001 0.0159 
 (0.0001)** (0.0002)** -0.001 (0.0008)** 
Experience squared -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 0 (0.0000)** 
Marital status 0.1245 0.1287 0.0644 0.1039 
 (0.0010)** (0.0037)** (0.0132)** (0.0101)** 
Marital status 
*Experience -0.0136 -0.0047 0.0018 -0.0172 
 (0.0001)** (0.0004)** -0.0016 (0.0011)** 
Marital status 
*Experience squared 0.0003 0 -0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000)** 
Number of children -0.0219 -0.0088 0.0089 0.0053 
 (0.0002)** (0.0004)** (0.0026)** (0.0014)** 
Observations 9605800 1220600 49900 128200 
R-squared 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.06 
  
 Immigrants 
Education 0.082 0.0859 0.0719 0.0748 
 (0.0003)** (0.0013)** (0.0007)** (0.0011)** 
Experience 0.0377 0.0463 0.0221 0.0446 
 (0.0003)** (0.0015)** (0.0010)** (0.0013)** 
Experience squared -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0005 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Marital status 0.4689 0.5383 0.4367 0.1892 
 (0.0058)** (0.0287)** (0.0128)** (0.0264)** 
Marital status 
*Experience -0.0339 -0.0475 -0.023 -0.0005 
 (0.0005)** (0.0027)** (0.0015)** -0.0022 
Marital status 
*Experience squared 0.0005 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.0000)** (0.0001)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Number of children -0.0075 -0.0245 -0.0395 0.0233 
 (0.0009)** (0.0039)** (0.0024)** (0.0027)** 
Cohort 1965-69 0.837 0.1809 0.9341 0.6635 
 (0.0047)** (0.0168)** (0.0128)** (0.0172)** 
  98  
Cohort 1960-64 0.7887 0.0881 0.9814 0.6293 
 (0.0048)** (0.0204)** (0.0135)** (0.0173)** 
Cohort 1950-59 0.7699 0.4007 1.097 0.7654 
 (0.0043)** (0.0207)** (0.0136)** (0.0162)** 
Cohort before 1950 0.6859 0.4325 1.1711 0.5529 
 (0.0046)** (0.0210)** (0.0152)** (0.0184)** 
Observations 482000 21600 58200 33700 
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.89 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.4b Coefficients of Wage Regressions, Female Immigrants and Natives, Census 
1980. Y=log(wagerate) 
 
 White Black Asian Mexican 
 Natives 
Education 0.0678 0.0687 0.0671 0.0544 
 (0.0000)** (0.0001)** (0.0004)** (0.0002)** 
Experience 0.0361 0.0303 0.0323 0.0286 
 (0.0000)** (0.0001)** (0.0004)** (0.0002)** 
Experience squared -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Marital status 0.12 0.0749 0.0691 0.0759 
 (0.0004)** (0.0016)** (0.0049)** (0.0028)** 
Marital status 
*Experience -0.0158 -0.0051 -0.0041 -0.0098 
 (0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0006)** (0.0003)** 
Marital status 
*Experience squared 0.0003 0.0001 0 0.0002 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 0 (0.0000)** 
Number of children -0.0393 -0.0155 -0.0343 -0.0135 
 (0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0012)** (0.0005)** 
Observations 3.29E+07 4565900 258200 915900 
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.08 
  
 Immigrants 
Education 0.0404 0.0477 0.0426 0.0206 
 (0.0002)** (0.0005)** (0.0002)** (0.0003)** 
Experience 0.0236 0.0226 0.018 0.0102 
 (0.0002)** (0.0005)** (0.0003)** (0.0004)** 
Experience squared -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Marital status 0.1116 0.234 0.0947 0.057 
 (0.0031)** (0.0086)** (0.0038)** (0.0058)** 
Marital status 
*Experience -0.011 -0.0154 -0.0039 -0.0006 
 (0.0003)** (0.0009)** (0.0005)** -0.0006 
Marital status 
*Experience squared 0.0002 0.0002 0 0.0001 
 (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 0 (0.0000)** 
Number of children -0.033 -0.0065 -0.0049 -0.0051 
 (0.0005)** (0.0013)** (0.0007)** (0.0007)** 
Cohort 1975-79 1.3691 1.027 1.3061 1.6791 
 (0.0038)** (0.0138)** (0.0052)** (0.0067)** 
Cohort 1970-74 1.4936 1.1123 1.4416 1.7482 
 (0.0038)** (0.0139)** (0.0054)** (0.0068)** 
Cohort 1965-69 1.4825 1.2255 1.498 1.7533 
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 (0.0037)** (0.0144)** (0.0057)** (0.0072)** 
Cohort 1960-64 1.4666 1.2656 1.4858 1.8075 
 (0.0037)** (0.0146)** (0.0060)** (0.0073)** 
Cohort 1950-59 1.4724 1.3026 1.4918 1.8811 
 (0.0038)** (0.0146)** (0.0062)** (0.0078)** 
Cohort before 1950 1.4768 1.071 1.7081 1.8898 
 (0.0041)** (0.0145)** (0.0080)** (0.0087)** 
Observations 1130600 184600 538200 349000 
R-squared 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.92 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.5 Differences in Predicted Log Wages across Cohorts 
 
Table 3.5a Differences in Predicted Log Wages across Cohorts, from Census 1970 to 
1980. 
 
  Immigrants Natives Immigrants-Natives
 Cohorts   
White 1965-69 to 1975-79 -0.389 (0.004) -0.259 (0.000) -0.130 (0.004) 
 1960-64 to 1970-74 -0.222 (0.004) -0.245 (0.000) 0.023 (0.004) 
 1950-59 to 1960-69 -0.251 (0.002) -0.247 (0.000) -0.004 (0.002) 
        
Black 1965-69 to 1975-79 -0.219 (0.01) -0.078 (0.001) -0.141 (0.01) 
 1960-64 to 1970-74 -0.077 (0.015) -0.087 (0.001) 0.010 (0.015) 
 1950-59 to 1960-69 -0.272 (0.015) -0.031 (0.001) -0.241 (0.015) 
        
Asian 1965-69 to 1975-79 -0.265 (0.006) -0.283 (0.005) 0.018 (0.008) 
 1960-64 to 1970-74 -0.177 (0.008) -0.243 (0.004) 0.066 (0.009) 
 1950-59 to 1960-69 -0.242 (0.007) -0.220 (0.005) -0.022 (0.009) 
        
Mexican 1965-69 to 1975-79 -0.064 (0.013) -0.147 (0.003) 0.083 (0.013) 
 1960-64 to 1970-74 -0.034 (0.012) -0.124 (0.003) 0.090 (0.012) 
 1950-59 to 1960-69 -0.186 (0.009) -0.118 (0.003) -0.068 (0.01) 
 
 
Table 3.5b Differences in Predicted Log Wages across Cohorts, from Census 1980 to 
1990. 
 
  Immigrants Natives Immigrants-Natives
 Cohorts   
White 1975-79 to 1985-89 0.047 (0.003) 0.047 (0.000) 0.000 (0.003) 
 1970-74 to 1980-84 0.010 (0.003) 0.037 (0.000) -0.027 (0.003) 
 1965-69 to 1975-79 0.096 (0.003) 0.033 (0.000) 0.063 (0.003) 
        
Black 1975-79 to 1985-89 0.090 (0.005) -0.038 (0.001) 0.128 (0.005) 
 1970-74 to 1980-84 0.078 (0.004) -0.030 (0.001) 0.108 (0.004) 
 1965-69 to 1975-79 0.106 (0.004) -0.009 (0.001) 0.115 (0.004) 
        
Asian 1975-79 to 1985-89 -0.021 (0.002) 0.064 (0.002) -0.085 (0.003) 
 1970-74 to 1980-84 -0.019 (0.002) 0.070 (0.002) -0.089 (0.003) 
 1965-69 to 1975-79 0.049 (0.003) 0.071 (0.002) -0.022 (0.003) 
        
Mexican 1975-79 to 1985-89 -0.130 (0.003) -0.097 (0.002) -0.034 (0.004) 
 1970-74 to 1980-84 -0.144 (0.003) -0.094 (0.001) -0.050 (0.003) 
 1965-69 to 1975-79 -0.076 (0.004) -0.084 (0.001) 0.007 (0.004) 
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Table 3.5c Differences in Predicted Log Wages across Cohorts, from Census 1990 to 
2000. 
 
  Immigrants Natives Immigrants-Natives
 Cohorts   
White 1985-89 to 1995-99 0.095 (0.002) 0.101 (0.000) -0.005 (0.002) 
 1980-84 to 1990-94 0.104 (0.002) 0.111 (0.000) -0.007 (0.002) 
 1975-79 to 1985-89 0.077 (0.003) 0.112 (0.000) -0.035 (0.003) 
        
Black 1985-89 to 1995-99 0.004 (0.003) 0.059 (0.000) -0.054 (0.003) 
 1980-84 to 1990-94 0.035 (0.003) 0.056 (0.000) -0.021 (0.003) 
 1975-79 to 1985-89 -0.029 (0.003) 0.053 (0.000) -0.081 (0.003) 
        
Asian 1985-89 to 1995-99 0.151 (0.002) 0.099 (0.002) 0.051 (0.003) 
 1980-84 to 1990-94 0.091 (0.002) 0.105 (0.002) -0.014 (0.002) 
 1975-79 to 1985-89 0.063 (0.002) 0.108 (0.002) -0.045 (0.002) 
        
Mexican 1985-89 to 1995-99 0.098 (0.002) 0.071 (0.001) 0.026 (0.003) 
 1980-84 to 1990-94 0.063 (0.002) 0.071 (0.001) -0.008 (0.003) 
 1975-79 to 1985-89 0.040 (0.002) 0.074 (0.001) -0.034 (0.003) 
 
    Note: (1) Source.-Tables A3.4 and 3.4. 
(2) Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated by extending the two sample 
t-test formula to four samples. The standard error of (y1-y2)-(y3-y4)=sqrt(se1^2+se2^2+se3^2+se4^2). 
(3) Natives’ predicted log wages are calculated across Census years, using the same X means 
as used for corresponding immigrant cohorts. For example, the first row for natives in Table 3.5a is the 
difference in predicted wages between Census 1970 and 1980, using average X means of cohort 1965-
69 and cohort 1975-79.  
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Table A3.1 Coefficients of Wage Regressions, Male Immigrants and Natives: Dependent 
Variable = Log(wage rate/10)  (Male 1970-80) 
 
 Whites  Blacks Asians Mexicans 
Variable Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.
1980 natives: 
EDUC 0.06 (0.002)  0.05 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002)
EXPER 0.04 (0.003)  0.01 (0.004) 0.03 (0.003) 0.02 (0.003)
EXPER2 0.00 (0)  0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 
MAR 0.16 (0.016)  0.16 (0.02) 0.21 (0.015) 0.17 (0.018)
HLTH -0.14 (0.027)  -0.11 (0.041) -0.17 (0.035) -0.13 (0.033)
SMSA 0.16 (0.013)  0.27 (0.025) 0.19 (0.019) 0.14 (0.017)
CONST. -2.39 (0.047)  -2.33 (0.068) -2.28 (0.05) -2.18 (0.05) 
          
1980 immigrants: 
EDUC 0.05 (0.001)  0.04 (0.003) 0.06 (0.001) 0.03  (0.002)
EXPER 0.03 (0.001)  0.01 (0.004) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01  (0.003)
EXPER2 0.00 (0)  0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00  (0) 
MAR 0.18 (0.008)  0.09 (0.022) 0.13 (0.012) 0.17  (0.014)
HLTH -0.18  (0.017)  -0.02 (0.062) -0.11 (0.032) -0.09  (0.032)
SMSA 0.12 (0.01)  0.22 (0.051) 0.00 (0.019) 0.15  (0.017)
D75 -2.21  (0.024)  -2.32 (0.083) -2.29 (0.035) -2.22  (0.048)
D70 -2.19  (0.024)  -2.14 (0.084) -2.13 (0.036) -2.06  (0.048)
D65 -2.10  (0.024)  -2.06 (0.088) -2.02 (0.037) -1.97  (0.05) 
D60 -2.06  (0.025)  -2.06 (0.094) -1.96 (0.04) -1.92  (0.052)
D50 -2.06  (0.024)  -2.04 (0.093) -1.96 (0.04) -1.84  (0.053)
D40 -2.07  (0.025)  -2.12 (0.089) -1.91 (0.043) -1.86  (0.056)
          
1970 natives: 
EDUC 0.07 (0.001)  0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.007) 0.07  (0.003)
EXPER 0.04 (0.001)  0.03 (0.002) 0.04 (0.006) 0.04  (0.003)
EXPER2 0.00 (0)  0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00  (0) 
MAR 0.19 (0.01)  0.17 (0.011) 0.21 (0.041) 0.22  (0.024)
HLTH -0.12  (0.015)  -0.04 (0.019) -0.21 (0.081) -0.07  (0.039)
SMSA 0.19 (0.008)  0.29 (0.011) 0.02 (0.075) 0.20  (0.021)
CONST. -2.49  (0.021)  -2.64 (0.024) -2.31 (0.118) -2.71  (0.046)
          
1970 immigrants: 
EDUC 0.05 (0.002)  0.07 (0.011) 0.07 (0.005) 0.03  (0.005)
EXPER 0.04 (0.002)  0.03 (0.014) 0.03 (0.006) 0.03  (0.006)
EXPER2 0.00 (0)  0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00  (0) 
MAR 0.14 (0.018)  0.01 (0.089) 0.14 (0.042) 0.18  (0.037)
HLTH -0.12  (0.031)  -0.14 (0.176) -0.28 (0.086) 0.05  (0.061)
SMSA 0.12 (0.019)  0.26 (0.15) 0.03 (0.052) 0.32  (0.04) 
D65 -2.18  (0.039)  -2.75 (0.236) -2.50 (0.102) -2.53  (0.08) 
D60 -2.07  (0.041)  -2.63 (0.249) -2.33 (0.107) -2.38  (0.086)
D50 -2.06  (0.039)  -2.67 (0.25) -2.31 (0.108) -2.32  (0.088)
D40 -2.04  (0.042)  -2.86 (0.27) -2.27 (0.118) -2.25  (0.099)
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Table A3.2 Means of Independent Variables in 1980 (Male) 
 
 
 Year of Migration 
 1975-1979 1970-1974 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 <1950 
White:       
EDUC 13.79  11.57  11.73  12.33  12.53  12.72  
EXPER 18.59  22.23  24.69  25.57  27.01  33.52  
EXPER2 455.10  621.11  726.50  760.28  868.54  1237.47  
MAR 0.77  0.82  0.84  0.83  0.83  0.84  
HLTH 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.06  
SMSA 0.91  0.91  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.87  
N 4940 4423 6034 5852 15423 10635 
       
Black:       
EDUC 11.67  12.22  12.52  13.14  12.41  10.74  
EXPER 19.59  20.28  22.56  23.48  27.48  32.40  
EXPER2 491.04  524.74  611.34  643.71  899.32  1180.73  
MAR 0.65  0.72  0.74  0.74  0.67  0.68  
HLTH 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.07  
SMSA 0.96  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.95  0.84  
N 1183 1790 1513 563 524 586 
       
Asian:       
EDUC 13.94  15.25  15.59  15.67  15.02  12.45  
EXPER 17.66  16.46  18.29  20.14  22.89  33.77  
EXPER2 426.53  366.52  429.95  489.62  626.58  1252.17  
MAR 0.75  0.81  0.86  0.85  0.82  0.86  
HLTH 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.04  
SMSA 0.94  0.95  0.94  0.93  0.93  0.91  
N 7286 5689 3777 1727 1936 985 
       
Mexican:       
EDUC 6.17  6.51  6.93  7.14  8.25  7.95  
EXPER 24.27  23.25  23.90  28.12  30.24  36.13  
EXPER2 687.41  624.31  659.35  906.96  1067.49  1446.21  
MAR 0.61  0.81  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.85  
HLTH 0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.06  
SMSA 0.87  0.90  0.89  0.85  0.86  0.83  
N 3496 4762 3323 2479 3261 1613 
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White         
1965-69 0.114 (0.008)  0.095 (0.012) 0.019 (0.015) 
1960-64 0.129 (0.003)  0.027 (-0.075) 0.101 (0.005) 
1950-59 0.021 (0.001)  0.033 (-0.008) -0.012 (-0.001) 
        
Black        
1965-69 0.259 (0.007)  -0.062 (-0.084) 0.320 (0.026) 
1960-64 0.081 (0.007)  -0.200 (0.068) 0.281 (0.04) 
1950-59 0.023 (0.015)  -0.174 (0.047) 0.197 (0.045) 
        
Asian        
1965-69 0.275 (0.004)  0.119 (0.009) 0.155 (0.01) 
1960-64 0.174 (0.005)  -0.006 (-0.003) 0.180 (0.016) 
1950-59 0.024 (0.006)  -0.051 (0.038) 0.075 (0.024) 
        
Mexican        
1965-69 0.253 (0.004)  0.142 (0.016) 0.111 (0.009) 
1960-64 0.139 (0.005)  0.050 (-0.015) 0.090 (0.007) 
1950-59 0.106 (0.004)  0.101 (-0.084) 0.005 (0) 
Source.-Tables A3.1 and A3.2. 
Note.- Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table A3.4 Means of Independent Variables of Female Immigrants Aged 18-64, by 
Census Year and by Ethnic Group 
 
Census 1970, White 
 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 <1950  
educ 10.59 10.63 11.00 10.71  
exper 15.91 19.23 21.75 34.65  
exper2 403.66 532.19 657.55 1334.00  
mar 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.65  
hlth 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06  
smsa 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.81  
marexper 10.72 12.91 16.14 21.90  
marexper2 267.17 338.90 481.86 811.66  
nchild 0.79 1.02 1.16 0.90  
N 553 526 1423 2187  
Census 1970, Black 
 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 <1950  
educ 9.91 11.08 10.80 11.51  
exper 17.94 21.10 26.35 31.52  
exper2 449.54 626.99 832.94 1101.11  
mar 0.37 0.36 0.47 0.61  
hlth 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.06  
smsa 0.92 1.00 0.97 1.00  
marexper 6.21 6.23 9.81 18.84  
marexper2 142.17 127.61 263.09 636.54  
nchild 0.52 1.18 0.75 0.92  
N 106 28 32 36  
Census 1980, Asian 
 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 <1950  
educ 13.23 11.71 12.39 11.55  
exper 11.17 17.07 18.79 27.83  
exper2 260.91 485.57 503.91 935.08  
mar 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.72  
hlth 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06  
smsa 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.86  
marexper 7.19 11.01 14.76 20.50  
marexper2 166.17 294.66 399.93 668.25  
nchild 0.75 1.13 1.56 1.43  
N 206 113 156 10  
Census 1980, Mexican 
 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 <1950  
educ 6.72 5.82 7.03 7.52  
exper 18.24 23.05 21.72 34.39  
exper2 479.62 681.06 631.90 1387.04  
mar 0.39 0.56 0.53 0.61  
  107  
hlth 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09  
smsa 0.84 0.88 0.82 0.83  
marexper 8.03 12.64 11.91 18.41  
marexper2 195.61 353.80 319.21 662.29  
nchild 1.41 1.84 2.06 1.19  
N 51 64 111 102  
      
Census 1980, White 
 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 
educ 12.56  11.19  11.37  12.16  12.29  
exper 13.56  17.62  19.46  18.94  24.30  
exper2 323.93  461.98  546.04  522.09  755.69  
mar 0.67  0.69  0.67  0.63  0.67  
hlth 0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  
smsa 0.93  0.91  0.91  0.90  0.91  
marexper 9.86  13.33  14.29  14.09  17.02  
marexper2 235.75  353.48  395.72  395.24  527.63  
nchild 0.74  1.09  1.09  1.10  1.05  
N 1176 1076 1611 1798 3557 
Census 1980, Black 
 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 
educ 11.55  12.00  12.21  12.11  12.23  
exper 14.72  15.56  20.83  20.07  18.13  
exper2 356.54  378.07  568.60  579.98  520.07  
mar 0.38  0.42  0.48  0.44  0.39  
hlth 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.05  
smsa 0.99  1.00  1.00  0.96  0.95  
marexper 6.08  7.01  10.24  9.26  7.09  
marexper2 148.02  151.94  272.11  246.50  194.77  
nchild 0.94  1.24  1.54  1.36  1.04  
N 421 533 505 153 147 
Census 1980, Asian 
 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 
educ 12.85  13.63  13.90  13.08  12.95  
exper 12.54  14.72  17.26  19.44  24.01  
exper2 278.07  329.53  419.19  541.29  733.65  
mar 0.63  0.70  0.72  0.71  0.68  
hlth 0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.04  
smsa 0.94  0.95  0.94  0.93  0.94  
marexper 9.02  10.94  13.27  15.48  17.32  
marexper2 201.93  236.19  313.06  430.45  531.56  
nchild 1.02  1.26  1.42  1.24  1.06  
N 1912 1569 897 431 490 
Census 1980, Mexican 
 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 
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educ 7.12  7.17  8.17  9.21  9.12  
exper 14.53  17.03  19.16  18.07  24.44  
exper2 316.77  392.05  520.91  504.41  760.77  
mar 0.55  0.64  0.64  0.57  0.67  
hlth 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.02  
smsa 0.94  0.95  0.91  0.89  0.89  
marexper 8.43  11.41  12.88  11.09  16.78  
marexper2 179.51  258.10  339.23  300.80  508.23  
nchild 1.28  1.84  1.84  1.74  2.02  
N 789 998 606 437 508 
 
Census 1990, White 
 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 
educ 14.11  13.96  13.54  12.92  13.27  
exper 12.26  15.46  17.02  16.74  19.00  
exper2 263.36  352.83  436.34  456.69  534.84  
mar 0.59  0.65  0.62  0.56  0.62  
hlth 0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  
smsa 0.92  0.92  0.91  0.89  0.89  
marexper 8.17  11.13  12.07  11.89  13.75  
marexper2 173.29  248.74  309.44  323.56  398.74  
nchild 0.54  0.84  0.94  0.89  0.89  
N 1275 1012 1097 1438 1879 
Census 1990, Black 
 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 
educ 12.30  12.55  13.32  13.61  13.70  
exper 13.53  15.12  16.30  17.06  22.55  
exper2 281.88  345.61  397.32  425.67  658.17  
mar 0.37  0.40  0.44  0.39  0.45  
hlth 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.03  
smsa 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98  0.99  
marexper 5.66  6.64  7.90  7.44  10.32  
marexper2 116.22  148.51  186.67  177.95  293.49  
nchild 0.87  1.21  1.26  1.36  1.18  
N 548 709 543 554 389 
Census 1990, Asian 
 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 
educ 13.73  13.63  13.98  14.24  14.76  
exper 13.00  14.82  15.99  17.95  19.34  
exper2 298.61  348.83  380.78  463.37  535.95  
mar 0.56  0.61  0.66  0.65  0.66  
hlth 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  
smsa 0.95  0.96  0.95  0.93  0.92  
marexper 8.23  10.50  11.89  13.71  14.32  
marexper2 190.67  249.83  280.17  350.91  395.73  
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nchild 0.75  1.09  1.22  1.19  1.04  
N 2449 2712 2476 1862 987 
Census 1990, Mexican 
 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 
educ 8.63  8.16  8.11  8.92  9.48  
exper 13.37  15.88  18.46  19.00  21.97  
exper2 286.03  363.22  475.77  521.71  650.20  
mar 0.45  0.54  0.61  0.62  0.58  
hlth 0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  
smsa 0.93  0.92  0.94  0.92  0.93  
marexper 6.48  9.28  12.26  13.26  13.16  
marexper2 138.41  208.03  303.59  360.31  380.75  
nchild 0.93  1.50  1.91  1.95  1.79  
N 1394 1539 1620 1408 764 
 
Census 2000, White 
 1995-99 1990-94 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 
educ 14.84  15.02  14.58  14.45  14.31  
exper 12.66  15.26  16.86  16.75  18.64  
exper2 268.06  348.23  393.60  424.50  511.39  
mar 0.57  0.62  0.61  0.55  0.59  
hlth 0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.09  
smsa 0.81  0.84  0.82  0.74  0.77  
marexper 8.22  10.75  11.56  11.23  13.05  
marexper2 172.57  245.04  267.31  290.32  367.44  
nchild 0.70  0.85  0.95  0.91  0.81  
N 2273 2019 1316 1266 1270 
Census 2000, Black 
 1995-99 1990-94 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 
educ 12.94  13.15  13.61  13.52  14.05  
exper 13.19  15.15  16.85  19.50  21.25  
exper2 292.29  349.88  402.02  506.80  567.96  
mar 0.34  0.40  0.41  0.44  0.46  
hlth 0.21  0.18  0.20  0.22  0.19  
smsa 0.92  0.92  0.93  0.94  0.92  
marexper 5.34  6.96  7.58  9.41  10.54  
marexper2 115.28  155.22  171.84  236.82  282.07  
nchild 0.77  1.12  1.25  1.49  1.40  
N 816 831 982 979 584 
Census 2000, Asian 
 1995-99 1990-94 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 
educ 14.78  14.42  14.25  14.21  14.77  
exper 12.36  15.63  17.25  17.84  20.18  
exper2 285.77  371.80  427.19  457.34  549.32  
mar 0.57  0.62  0.65  0.61  0.64  
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hlth 0.14  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.12  
smsa 0.85  0.88  0.87  0.89  0.87  
marexper 8.20  10.85  12.55  12.77  14.24  
marexper2 190.82  260.56  307.15  328.71  386.02  
nchild 0.67  1.03  1.18  1.19  1.10  
N 2966 3575 3462 3551 2882 
Census 2000, Mexican 
 1995-99 1990-94 1985-89 1980-84 1975-79 
educ 9.36  9.26  9.51  9.37  9.46  
exper 13.67  15.70  18.00  20.09  23.06  
exper2 300.68  356.03  434.82  525.14  673.93  
mar 0.50  0.58  0.62  0.59  0.62  
hlth 0.18  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.19  
smsa 0.76  0.79  0.78  0.79  0.80  
marexper 7.69  10.07  12.06  12.63  15.11  
marexper2 176.91  231.82  286.78  327.18  440.35  
nchild 0.94  1.50  1.80  1.98  1.97  
N 2883 2918 2912 2303 2072 
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Figure 2.1 Employment Annual Changes, Maryland vs. the U.S. 
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Figure 2.1b Employment Annual Change, Computer and
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Figure 2.1d Employment Annual Change, Professional
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Source: Author’s calculation from the BLS. 
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Figure 2.2 Quarter Earnings, Hi-tech Workers and Low-tech Workers 
    
Figure 2.2a. Quarterly Earnings of Hi-Tech Workers



























































hi-tech workers never displaced
hi-tech workers displaced in 1994:4
 
Figure 2.2b. Quarterly Earnings of Low-Tech Workers































































low-tech workers never displaced
low-tech workers displaced in 1999:4
 
 
  113  
Figure 2.3 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, 
without Missing Earnings 
 
Figure 2.3a Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, without Missing Earnings
































Note: Lines labeled “hi-tech displaced workers” depict the predicted quarterly earnings of a typical hi-
tech displaced worker, by applying the estimated coefficients from equation (2) to the median 
technology level of all hi-tech workers. Lines labeled “low-tech displaced workers” depict the 
predicted quarterly earnings of a typical low-tech displaced worker, by applying the estimated 
coefficients from equation (2) to the median technology level of all low-tech workers. Technology is 
measured by fraction of workers using computers at work. Shaded areas indicate that the associated 
coefficients are statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
 
This Note applies to Figures 3b through 3d, except that different technology measures are used in each 
of the following figures. 
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Figure 2.3b Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, without Missing Earnings






















































Figure 2.3c Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, without Missing Earnings
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Figure 2.3d Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, without Missing Earnings
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Figure 2.4 Fraction of Workers with Non-missing Earnings
after Displacement
 (Hi-Tech vs. Low-Tech Workers)
 
 
Note: The differences are statistically significant between hi-tech and low-tech workers in all quarters. 
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Figure 2.5 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, with 
Missing Earnings Replaced by Zeros 
 
Figure 2.5a Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, with Missing Earnings Replaced
by Zeros

































The same notes for Figures 2.3a-2.3d can be applied to Figures 2.5a-2.5d, except that Figures 2.5a-2.5d 
are based on a sample including missing earnings, which are coded as zero earnings in wage 
regressions. 
 
Figure 2.5b  Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
Before and After Displacement, with Missing Earnings
Replaced by Zeros












































   
 
  118  
Figure 2.5c Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, with Missing Earnings Replaced
by Zeros









































Figure 2.5d Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, Before
and After Displacement, with Missing Earnings Replaced
by Zeros
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Figure 2.6 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, after 
Controlling for Sample Attritions 
 
Figure 2.6a Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, with
workers currently working in neighbor states































The same notes for Figures 2.3a can be applied to Figures 2.6a-2.6c, except that Figures 2.6a-2.6c are 
based on samples including some workers who drop out from the MD data. Approaches imputing the 
missing earnings of these “disappearers” are discussed in the text. 
 
Figure 2.6b Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
Missing Earnings Imputed for Permanent Disappears
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Figure 2.6c Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
Missing Earnings Imputed for Temporary Disappears
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Figure 2.7 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, by 
Earnings Rank 
 
Figure 2.7a Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
High-Earners

























































The same notes for Figures 2.3a can be applied to Figures 2.7a-2.7c, except that Figures 2.7a-2.7c are 
based on three different samples defined by workers’ earnings ranks. 
 
Figure 2.7b Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
Mid-Earners
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Figure 2.7c Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
Low-Earners
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Figure 2.8 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, by 
Sample Period 
 
Figure 2.8a Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
1989-1999
































The same notes for Figures 2.3a can be applied to Figures 2.8a and 2.8b, except that Figures 2.8a and 
2.8b are based on two samples of different time periods.  
Figure 2.8b Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
2000-2005
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Figure A2.1 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, 
Defined by Plant Closing 
 
Figure A2.1 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,
defined by plant closing









































Note: (1) Displaced workers are defined as workers who lose jobs as part of a plant closing. Mergers 
and splits are ruled out using the same criteria as those used in the definition of displacement based on 
mass layoff. (2)Lines labeled “hi-tech displaced workers” depict the predicted quarterly earnings of a 
typical hi-tech displaced worker, by applying the estimated coefficients from equation (2) to the 
median level computer usage of all hi-tech workers. Lines labeled “low-tech” depict the predicted 
quarterly earnings, assuming computer usage is equal to the median level of all low-tech workers. 
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Figure A2.2 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, before and after Displacement, 
Who are Displaced before 2000:3 
 
Figure A2.2 Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, who are
displaced before 2000:3









































Note: (1) Displaced workers included in this figure are constrained to those who lose jobs before 
2000:3. For these workers, all the twenty quarters post displacement can be observed in the data set. 
(2)Lines labeled “hi-tech displaced workers” depict the predicted quarterly earnings of a typical hi-tech 
displaced worker, by applying the estimated coefficients from equation (2) to the median level 
computer usage of all hi-tech workers. Lines labeled “low-tech” depict the predicted quarterly earnings, 
assuming computer usage is equal to the median level of all low-tech workers. Shaded areas indicate 
that the associated coefficients are statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
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Figure 3.1 Fraction of Female Immigrants Speaking only English or Speaking English 
very well 
 
Figure 3.1 Fraction of female immigrants speaking only English or
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Figure 3.2 Fraction of High School Dropouts 
 
Figure 3.2 Fraction of high school dropouts,






















Figure 3.3 Fraction of College Graduates 
 
Figure 3.3 Fraction of college graduates,






















Data source: Female: Table 3.2 in this paper; Male: Table 2 in Borjas (1995).  
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Figure 3.4 Raw Log Wages 
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Note: (1) Immigrants’ average raw log wages are measured within five years of stay in the U.S. 
for each cohort. For example, average log wage of cohort 1965-69 is measured in Census 1970. 
          (2) Natives’ average raw log wages are measured in corresponding Census years to each 
immigrant cohort. For example, average log wage in Census 1970 is drawn for natives side by 
side with immigrant cohort 1965-69.  
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Figure 3.5 Differences in Predicted Wages between Cohort 1965-69 and Cohort 1975-79 
 
Figure 3.5 Differences in Predicted Wages between
Cohort 1965-69 and Cohort 1975-79, by gender, by



































Note: (1) Data source: Table 3.5a for female immigrants; Table 5 in Borjas (1985) for male immigrants; 
(2) Each bar represents the predicted wage of cohort 1975-79 minus that of cohort 1965-69. 
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Figure 3.6 Predicted Log Wages 
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Note: (1) Immigrants’ predicted log wages are measured within five years of stay in the U.S. for 
each cohort. For example, predicted log wage of cohort 1965-69 is measured in Census 1970. 
          (2) Natives’ predicted log wages are measured in corresponding Census years to each 
immigrant cohort. For example, predicted log wage in Census 1970 is drawn for natives side by 
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